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Recent developments in information technologies, especially Web 2.0 technologies, have 
radically transformed many markets through disintermediation and decentralization. Lower 
barriers of entry in these markets enable small firms and individuals to engage in 
transactions that were otherwise impossible. Yet, the issues of informational asymmetry 
that plague traditional markets still arise, only to be exacerbated by the “virtual” nature of 
these marketplaces. The three essays of my dissertation empirically examine how 
participants, many of whom are entrepreneurs, tackle the issue of asymmetric information 
to derive benefits from trade in two different contexts. In Essay 1, I investigate the role of 
online social networks in mitigating information asymmetry in an online peer-to-peer 
lending market, and find that the relational dimensions of these networks are especially 
effective for this purpose. In Essay 2, I exploit a natural experiment in the same 
marketplace to study the effect of shared geographical ties on investor decisions, and find 
that “home bias” is not only robust but also has an interesting interaction pattern with 
rational decision criteria. In Essay 3, I study how the emergence of new contract forms, 
enabled by new monitoring technologies, changes the effectiveness of traditional signals 
that affect a buyers’ choice of sellers in online outsourcing. Using a matched-sample 
approach, I show that the effectiveness of online ratings and certifications differs under 
pay-for-time contracts versus pay-for-deliverable contracts. In all, the three essays of my 
dissertation present new empirical evidence of how agents leverage various network ties, 
signals and incentives to facilitate transactions in decentralized online markets, form 
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INTRODUCTION TO DISSERTATION 
 
Developments in information technologies, especially Internet and Web2.0 technologies, 
have not only reduced the costs of communication but also created new mechanisms for 
individuals and firms to interact with each other. One of the most salient changes is the 
emergence of Internet-based, highly decentralized marketplaces populated with large 
numbers of small participants. Without the Internet, these atomistic individuals are likely to 
find the transaction costs prohibitively high, so they either choose not to enter the market at 
all, or enter via intermediaries. By reducing the fixed cost of business transactions, the 
Internet has significantly changed this landscape. A “long tail” now exists not only in product 
variety, but also in the number of buyers and sellers of goods and services. On the other hand, 
while more opportunities for trade are likely to increase social welfare, the growing number 
of suppliers and buyers inevitably increases the costs of effectively matching them. 
Information asymmetry problems that plague traditional markets still exist in these nascent 
marketplaces – only to be exacerbated by the anonymity and small-stake nature of individual 
transactions. A better understanding of the matching process in this marketplace has 
implications for academic researchers, policymakers, as well as entrepreneurs who seek to 
leverage the power of these online markets.  
With this as the background, I set out to empirically study how individuals in 
decentralized online marketplaces make decisions under uncertainty to form transaction ties. 
Two emerging marketplaces serve as the context for my research. The first one is online 
peer-to-peer lending, where individual lenders make unsecured loans to borrowers. This 
market has experienced significant growth worldwide in the past few years. Data from 
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Prosper.com, one of the largest peer-to-peer lending websites in the United States, is used for 
the first two essays. The second one is online software outsourcing, where buyers and sellers 
of customized software from around the world can make transactions with each other via the 
Internet. Proprietary data from a leading online software-outsourcing marketplace are used in 
the third essay. Both contexts present degrees of asymmetric information that are 
significantly higher than online product markets such as eBay, due to the nature of financial 
products (Essays 1 and 2) and software development contracts (Essay 3).  
The first essay in my dissertation specifically addresses the role of online social 
networks in addressing adverse selection in financial lending. I seek to link social network 
metrics to loan-level transactional outcomes, distinguishing between structural and relational 
aspects of the network. I emphasize the different identities, roles and actions of a borrower’s 
friend, and whether a particular dimension of social networks can serve as an effective 
mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry. I test and find that online social networks 
serve as “prisms” that help signal the credibility of a borrower to those outside the network. 
More importantly, the more verifiable these ties are, the more strongly they are associated 
with the ex-post riskiness of the loan. This effect survives a large number of robustness tests, 
including the textual content of descriptions as well as the images used in the loan request. 
Online social networks indeed can help mitigate asymmetric information and improve 
transaction efficiency in online peer-to-peer lending. 
The second essay delves further into the networks on Prosper.com to study the dyadic 
relationship among market participants. Drawing on theories of homophily and home bias, I 
investigate whether investors are more likely to invest in borrowers from their home state. To 
address this question, I exploit a natural experiment on Prosper.com where lenders were 
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constrained to one state, while borrowers came from almost all states. The start and end of 
the 10-day window were also largely unexpected. These unique features allow me to 
circumvent many empirical analysis issues in prior studies, such as endogeneity, strenuous 
data reduction, and specialized statistical methods. I find that even though this is an online 
marketplace, investors are still more likely to bid on loan requests from same-state borrowers; 
however, such benefit only accrues to borrowers with good credit grades. In fact, there is a 
bias against less creditworthy borrowers. I further show that the economic distance between 
borrower and lender states has a stronger effect on the decision of lenders than the spatial 
distance.  These results represent very conservative evidence of home bias, and how shared-
geographical ties between borrowers and lenders affect lender behavior.  
The third essay uses data from the emergent online market for software outsourcing, 
where software buyers and sellers (developers) from around the world participate in a 
decentralized online marketplace. The development in technologies allows buyers in such 
online labor markets to effectively monitor the effort level of sellers, making it possible for 
buyers and sellers to enter pay-for-time contracts. I study how the change in contract formats 
– pay-for-time contracts versus pay-for-deliverable contracts – affect how buyers interpret 
different signals from sellers, and choose the seller to work with. I focus on two signals that 
the literature has shown to be effective signals in online markets: online reputation and 
certifications. Data used in this study include comprehensive information about all 
developers who compete for buyers’ contracts, including those who lost in the auctions. 
While the literature typically holds that the online reputation system has a strong influence on 
individual choice in e-commerce, in this context, I find that it is only under pay-for-
deliverable (PFD) contracts that higher reputations lead to better chances of winning a 
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contract. When the contract format is changed to pay-for-time (PFT), buyers are more likely 
to take risk, giving new entrants (sellers) more opportunities to grow. In other words, 
changes in the contract mechanism can help reduce market concentration and increase 
competition. On the other hand, certifications do not have statistically significant impact on 
buyers’ choice under either contract forms. I further conduct exploratory textual analysis of 
the private communication between buyers and developers. Results show that different 
categories of information have different impact on buyers’ choice under different contract 
mechanisms. Whereas prior empirical studies of outsourcing were often restricted to buyer-
seller dyads that were ultimately in the contract, this dataset provides insights into the choice 
process of outsourcing clients. Most importantly, results in this essay show that as 
technology enables new contracting forms, the “Matthew Effect” in online reputation 
systems can be mitigated, as buyers substitute second-hand information from other buyers 
with first-hand information gathered through their own interaction with sellers.  
Overall, the three essays of my dissertation investigate two industries where the 
development of information technologies has not only significantly changed the relationship 
between trading partners, but also enable new mechanisms that allow efficient matching. 
These studies contribute to the literature and practice in the following ways.   
First, the three studies of my dissertation provide rich empirical evidence on how 
transactional ties in decentralized online markets are formed. These transactional ties can be 
borrowing and lending, or software development. Essay 1 focuses on the role of online social 
networks in this process; Essay 2 emphasizes the role of shared demographic information 
(geography); and Essay 3 examines the moderating effect of contract mechanism on the 
relation between various signals and the formation of transaction ties.  
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Second, my dissertation contributes to a growing literature on trust and reputation 
mechanisms in online markets. The first essay highlights online social networks as a new 
mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry and encourage trusting relationships; Essay 2 
emphasizes homophily-based trusting behavior; and the third essay, in particular, directly 
examines the effectiveness of online reputation systems. While online reputation systems 
have a tendency to create a Matthew Effect whereby larger sellers are more likely to be 
chosen, we can potentially alleviate this issue by revisiting the contracting relationship 
between trading partners.  
Last but not the least, all three studies share a focus on “small” players in these 
emerging markets, including entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can be on either side of the online 
lending market, and can also be on either side of the software development market. While the 
peer-to-peer lending model can serve as a new channel for small business financing, online 
software outsourcing can help small business buyers reduce the costs for software 
development, and enable developers to expand their market scopes. With an emphasis on the 
unique features of these markets, the findings of these studies can potentially increase the 
efficiency of these markets and further benefit market participants. 
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ESSAY 1: JUDGING BORROWERS BY THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN ONLINE 
PEER-TO-PEER LENDING
1
     
 
Abstract   
 
 
I study the online market for peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, in which individuals bid on 
unsecured microloans sought by other individual borrowers. Using a large sample of 
consummated and failed listings from the largest online P2P lending marketplace – 
Prosper.com, I test whether a borrower's online social networks can help mitigate 
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, focusing on the distinction 
between the structural and relational aspects of networks. While the structural aspects 
have limited to no significance, the relational aspects are consistently significant 
predictors of lending outcomes, with a striking gradation based on the verifiability and 
visibility of a borrower's social capital. Stronger and more verifiable relational network 
measures are associated with a higher likelihood of a loan being funded and lower 
interest rates for the borrowers, and lower risks of default for lenders. I discuss the 
implications of my findings for the disintermediation of financial markets and the design 
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The ability of online markets to efficiently bring together buyers and sellers has 
transformed businesses, spawned several success stories, and redefined the roles of 
traditional intermediaries. In this paper, I study the online market for peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending, where individuals make unsecured microloans to other individual borrowers. 
This market was virtually nonexistent in 2005 but has experienced significant growth 
since then. The biggest of them, Prosper.com, has logged over 200,000 listings seeking 
$1 billion in funding since its inception. Because the online P2P lending marketplace is 
highly decentralized with little opportunity for face-to-face contact between borrowers 
and lenders, the asymmetric information problems in traditional credit markets are 
especially amplified. My study examines whether social networks alleviate information 
asymmetry, and if so, what aspects of these networks help. I show that the social 
networks, specifically the relational aspects of networks based on the roles and identities 
of the network members, matter. Networks mitigate adverse selection and lead to better 
outcomes in all aspects of the lending process. 
Borrowers in the P2P market can create social networks and make these networks 
visible to potential lenders. I focus on two such highly prominent networks – a borrower's 
friendship ties, and a borrower's group membership. I examine whether these social 
networks – friendship ties and group affiliations – predict loan outcomes and find 
affirmative evidence. I then focus on the nature of borrowers' social networks, 
particularly on the roles and identities of the friends that comprise a borrower's social 
network. For instance, I examine whether a friend has undergone the verification 
necessary to become a Prosper.com lender and test whether these have more pronounced 
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effects on loan outcomes. Further into the friends “hierarchy”, I observe whether the 
friend has actually placed bids on the borrower's listing or other listings, and whether 
these bids were successful or not. In other words, I observe different grades of “the 
company that borrowers keep.” I examine whether networks explain the probability of 
attracting funding, the interest rate paid by borrowers, and the ex-post loan defaults and 
whether these economic effects become more pronounced along the relational hierarchy 
of the borrower's social network. 
I will summarize the results briefly first. My sample comprises 205,132 listings 
on Prosper.com from January 2007 to May 2008 seeking to borrow an aggregate amount 
of $1.7 billion. Of these, 16,500 listings for $114 million are successfully funded. I first 
analyze the probability that a listing is funded. I find that a borrower's friendship ties are 
significantly related to loan outcomes and the effects show a significant gradation effect 
based on the roles and identities of the borrower's friends. The stronger a tie and the more 
verifiable and visible it is to lenders, the greater the probability of attracting funding. 
Interestingly, non-actions by particularly verifiable relationships, such as non-
participation by lender-friends, lead to less favorable outcomes. I find similar effects 
when social capital is measured using group affiliations: verifiable antecedents matter. 
To assess the price effects, I include networks as an explanatory variable in a 
censored regression that explains loan rates conditional on the loan attracting funding. 
Social network variables reduce the interest rates on funded loans. While the above 
mentioned outcomes – probability of a borrower's loan being funded, and the interest rate 
of funded loans – indicate that specific features of a borrower's social network do indeed 
affect lenders' decisions, they do not shed light on the rationality of these decisions. To 
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examine whether the funding and interest rate decisions made by lenders are indeed 
rational, I examine the impact of the social network variables on default probabilities. I 
use survival models to test whether social networks have information about default 
probabilities beyond that contained in traditional credit variables. I find that borrowers 
with stronger and verifiable relationships are less likely to default. The results survive 
several robustness tests including analyses of subsamples without images, controls for 
non-linearities, as well as contents of images and text descriptions in listings. I describe 
these empirical analyses and the results subsequently in the paper. 
The theoretical motivation for my tests comes from research in multiple 
disciplines including sociology, economics, finance and information systems. Section 2 
reviews the related work more extensively. One strand of literature focuses on the 
relation between social capital and economic outcomes (e.g., Granovetter 2005). To this 
literature, I offer new evidence on the role played by social capital. As Granovetter (1972) 
writes, social capital is conventionally conceptualized either as an individual attribute that 
generates an economic benefit or as a group attribute of a collection of individuals that 
enhances the efficacy of transactions between the individuals for economic gain. 
Examples in sociology include Coleman (1988), Mizruchi (1992), or Putnam (1993). My 
results indicate that social capital between individuals plays another role: it serves as an 
additional source of verifiable information, and generates an informational externality 
that can be harvested to facilitate transactions with outsiders such as lenders in financial 
markets. 
In the management literature, Podolny (1993, 2001) articulates related resource 
and informational perspectives of social networks. Podolny argues that ties between two 
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market actors in the network can be understood as “pipes” that convey resources or 
information between them. Alternatively, the ties can be “prisms,” or informational cues 
that others rely to draw inferences about the quality of one or both of the market actors 
(Podolny 2001, page 34). My results represent novel evidence for the latter view. I find 
that a borrower's social network serves as a prism through which potential lenders deduce 
which borrowers to fund and at what interest rate. 
My findings are of interest from at least two other perspectives. One view of my 
study is that it represents data from credit markets that have an especially severe Akerlof 
(1970) style lemons problem. In the P2P marketplace, loan funding is achieved through 
bids of small lenders who put small sums of money to work. Virtually all lenders are 
strangers who possess little private information about the credit quality of borrowers. 
From this viewpoint, my findings represent evidence that agents adapt to mitigate adverse 
selection in ways remarkably consistent with economic theory. I find a positive role for 
soft information, i.e., fuzzy, hard-to-quantify information about borrowers beyond hard 
credit data such as ratings. Small lenders in the P2P market seem to process and use the 
soft information implied in borrowers' networks in their lending decisions. 
While the literature on soft information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; Rajan, 2002) emphasizes that it is critical to successful lending 
outcomes, such information is traditionally regarded as a province of financial 
intermediaries such as banks (Fama, 1985). It is interesting that soft information even 
arises in a non-intermediated credit markets in which individuals have small sums of 
money at stake. In this regard, my results also imply that concerns that electronic markets 
and disintermediation could lead to significant loss of soft information may be mitigated. 
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While information technology could subtract some forms of soft information, it could 
also bring in new forms of soft information such as a borrower's social capital. A related 
point is that the new sources of soft information need not be intermediary-generated: in 
my study, borrower-generated soft information usefully adds to agents' decision-making. 
From a market design perspective, my study emphasizes that such new information is 
most useful when there are credible mechanisms to enhance its verifiability to outside 
lenders. 
An alternative perspective of my study is that it analyzes the economic value of 
social networks. While it is widely accepted in economics and sociology that networks 
matter, especially to the sets of individuals forming the networks and the organizations 
that employ them, my study quantifies its value and puts additional boundary conditions 
to the claim. I find that networks are valuable not merely to individuals or organizations 
forming or containing them, but also to third-party outsiders, by helping mitigate 
informational asymmetry and adverse selection problems between the individuals in the 
network and outsiders. 
My study is of separate interest because of its focus on the economic value of 
online social networks, an area in which there is little prior work. While online networks 
may be as valuable as their offline counterparts, this is not obvious given the ease of 
creating and building them. The P2P lending marketplace is an especially interesting 
context to study online networks because such networks are integral to the marketplace. 
Furthermore, my study addresses a major limitation of the received work on online 
networks: the difficulty of quantifying economic outcomes or the strength of ties. This 
necessitates costly methods such as surveys or interviews (e.g. Karlan 2007; Moran 2005; 
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Uzzi 1999), or subjective measures of outcomes (e.g., Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006; Uzzi 
and Lancaster 2003). In my study of credit markets, both the network itself and the 
associated economic outcomes are quantifiable using relatively objective measures such 
as funding probability and interest rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical 
background and reviews the related literature. Sections 3 and 4 describe the research 
context and the data used in the study. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology, 
and Section 6 contains the results of the study. Section 7 provides details on the 
robustness checks. Section 8 discusses the implications of my results and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Motivation and Literature Review 
 
My study draws on and contributes to multiple streams of research in sociology, 
economics, finance and information systems. To place my findings in context, I review 
the related literature. 
The literature on social capital originates in sociology, but its role in facilitating 
economic exchanges and affecting behavior has attracted considerable attention in other 
disciplines. Granovetter (2005) overviews applications in such diverse areas as labor 
economics, price setting, production, financial innovation, and entrepreneurship. Recent 
work on the role of social capital includes Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), and 
Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007). One issue that often arises in this literature is the 
identification of social capital. As Granovetter (2005) writes, social capital is best thought 
of as being generated by actions, patterns, or processes of people outside the immediate 
economic context and the issue is whether economic gains arise as a by-product. 
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Social networks are viewed as promising avenues for identifying social capital, so 
the literature often identifies an individual's social capital using her social networks. For 
instance, Burt (1992, page 9) describes an individual's social capital as “friends, 
colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use 
your financial and human capital.” Portes (1998, page 6) adds that there is growing 
consensus on social capital being “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
membership in social networks or other social structures.” Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) 
survey the methodology used in empirical studies of social capital. They argue that the 
“most successful theoretical work and the most compelling empirical work” is the role of 
networks in facilitating economic exchange. My work, which studies how social capital is 
leveraged through networks, has precisely this focus. 
Theory suggests two avenues by which an actor's social network can influence 
transactional outcomes. Social networks can act as a direct channel for the transfer of 
information and resources. This role of social networks is termed as “pipes” by Podolny 
(1993, 2001). As noted by Granovetter (1973), information can flow through links, 
thereby either reducing the search costs for individuals, or enabling the gathering of 
heterogeneous information from different parts of the network. Within organizations, 
individuals occupying certain positions in the network can enjoy better information, 
easier access to resources, and therefore enjoy more power. Here again, the network ties 
serve as the channel for the flow of resources and utility accrues to the individuals on the 
nodes. 
Alternatively, Podolny (1993, 2001) argues that social networks can serve as 
“prisms” that reflect otherwise unobservable characteristics. When networks play this 
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role, it is critical that the social networks be credibly verifiable. Verifiability is 
particularly important in online networks because the ease of forming online networks 
may compromise their credibility. The verifiability issue is also important from a 
behavioral and marketing perspective, rather than a purely economic one. As noted by 
Rosenthal (1971), a message “ must be testable by means independent of its source and 
available to its receiver”to be verifiable. Such requirement of verifiability applies to 
online social networks as well. A borrower's social network is also subject to skepticism 
from lenders; it is credible only to the extent it is verifiable. In the online P2P lending 
markets, a borrower's social networks can play the role of “pipes” by serving as a conduit 
for borrowers to obtain financial or informational resources. Alternatively, a borrower's 
networks can serve as “prisms” to signal the quality of creditworthiness of the borrower 
to potential lenders. Whether social networks serve as “pipes” or “prisms” in this market 
is another empirical question that I seek to address in this study. 
The social networks literature also offers a useful taxonomy of the different 
dimensions of social capital (e.g. Granovetter 1992; Moran 2005). Structural 
embeddedness refers to the position of an actor in the network. Relational embeddedness 
refers to the quality of the relationship among actors in the network. Empirical evidence 
on structural aspects includes work on venture capital by Shane and Cable (2002) and 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Yu (2007). Studies in sociology and management show that 
certain positions on a given network endow individuals control over resources, e.g., 
individuals in hubs, those with weak ties (Granovetter, 1972) or those occupying 
structural holes (Burt 1992). Bampo, Ewing, Mather, Stewart, and Wallace (2008) 
investigate the structure of digital networks on the performance of viral marketing 
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campaigns. Studies of relational embeddedness include Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada 
(2006) for open software projects; Robert, Dennis and Ahuja (2008) for knowledge 
integration and performance in digitally-enabled teams; and Cowan, Jonard, and 
Zimmerman (2007) for the networks of collaborators. My study stresses the importance 
of relational aspects, the roles and identities of the actors on an individual's networks. 
My study also adds to an extensive literature in finance and economics on credit 
markets. A key theme in this literature is information asymmetry, which presents itself 
through ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard. The ex-ante information 
asymmetry considers the Akerlof (1970) style adverse selection problems in lending. 
Social networks can provide information relevant to lending outcomes. If someone who 
knows the borrower personally can attest to his or her creditworthiness, or even better, 
participate in lending to the borrower, the loan should be relatively less risky. Obtaining 
and transforming such information into a usable format was traditionally difficult. 
Digitization and information technology has helped overcome this constraint. The key 
issue with such information is its reliability, which can be mitigated if the marketplace 
has credible verifiability standards. 
Empirical studies seek to understand “soft information” in financial 
intermediation. Using survey data on small business loans, Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
find that soft information in bank or supplier relationships could increase the supply of 
credit to small firms. Organizational researchers apply social network theories to the 
banking sector. Using a social embeddedness approach, Granovetter (1985) and Uzzi 
(1999) study how bank-borrower relationships affect a firm's acquisition and cost of 
capital and introduce the idea of networks in these papers. My study adds to this literature 
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by focusing explicitly on the role of social networks as a source of soft information. I 
illustrate how technology hardens it into usable form for lenders, show its use in lending 
decisions, and quantify its effect. I show that technological progress can lead to soft 
information being used even in disintermediated credit markets. 
An alternative view of intermediaries is that they economize on search costs of 
matching borrowers and lenders. The Internet lowers the cost of search (Malone, Yates, 
and Benjamin 1987), making disintermediated search more viable. Additionally, 
digitization based on Web 2.0 technologies alters the way in which users connect and 
interact with each other. This results in new sources of soft information and social capital 
and new methods of transmitting the information. The net effect of these forces is to 
facilitate the growth of lending networks that are decentralized. 
There is a small but growing body of research on peer-to-peer lending that 
focuses on the personal characteristics of borrowers to test theories of taste-based 
discrimination (Pope and Sydnor 2008; Ravina 2008). Pope and Sydnor examine loan 
listings between June 2006 and May 2007 while Ravina examines listings for a one 
month period between March 12, 2007 and April 16, 2007. Both papers focus on race and 
“beauty” of the borrowers, which I control for in my analysis. My main objective is the 
effect of social networks after controlling for these potential confounding factors. 
Online P2P lending can also be viewed as a digitized and somewhat modified 
version of traditional microfinance programs (see, e.g., Morduch 1999 for a review of 
this work). Like peer-to-peer lending, microfinance is typically collateral-free and there 
are similar information asymmetry problems in both settings. My results suggest an 
additional parallel. P2P lenders also appear to rely on soft collateral implied by social 
17 
networks or group attributes for repayment, as do lenders in microfinance (Ledgerwood 
1999). The scalability of P2P lending across geographic regions and borrower types 
suggest that digitization and technology could help mitigate the problems that limit the 
scaling of traditional microfinance programs. 
Finally, the term peer-to-peer has also been used to contrast different 
configurations in computer networks. Whereas in a client-server architecture, one server 
occupies a central position in the network, in a peer-to-peer architecture all computers are 
on equal footing – there are no hierarchies and all computers are peer nodes. The 
decentralized, distributed nature of P2P networks is usually considered an advantage in 
computer networking. Over time, the idea of decentralized peer-to-peer networks has 
been adapted to wider contexts. A well-known example is peer-to-peer music sharing (e.g. 
Bhattacharjee et al, 2007; Asvanund, Clay, Krishnan and Smith 2004). These studies 
typically investigate the impact of the growth of P2P music sharing networks on sales and 
consumer welfare, and uses' decision to contribute resources. Krishnan, Smith, Tang and 
Telang (2006) further explores economic issues related to business models that can be 
built upon file-sharing P2P services. More recently, IS researchers are also increasingly 
interested in online social networks, such as co-purchase networks and recommendation 
networks (e.g. Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2008, 2009). The unique feature of 
online P2P lending relative to this work is the availability of objective transactional 
outcomes of both the structural and relational aspects of networks. 
 
3. Institutional Background on P2P lending 
 
My data come from a leading online peer-to-peer lending website, Prosper.com. 
Prosper.com opened to the public on February 5th, 2006. At the end of 2008, it had 
18 
830,000 members and more than $178 million in funded loans. The following paragraphs 
describe the lending process and the information provided by borrowers seeking loans 
during the duration of my study. 
 
3.1  Verification 
 
Users join Prosper.com by providing an email address, which is verified by the 
website. To actually engage in a transaction, users must go through additional verification. 
Borrowers must reside in the U.S., have a valid social security number, a valid bank 
account number, a minimum FICO (Fair Isaac Credit Organization) credit score of 520, 
and a valid driver's license and address. The details are verified by Prosper.com, which 
also extracts a credit report from Experian, a major credit reporting agency in the US. 
Loan proceeds are credited to the bank account and funds withdrawn automatically for 
monthly loan repayments. In the time period I study, borrowers can borrow a maximum 
of $25,000, and a maximum of 2 concurrent loans. Loans amortize over a 36 month 
period. Prosper lenders are also subject to verification of the social security number, 
driver's license number, and bank account number. To protect privacy, the true identity of 
borrowers and lenders is never revealed in the website. Communication occurs through 
usernames that are chosen when signing up. 
 
3.2  Listing 
 
A loan request is a listing that indicates the loan amount and the maximum 
interest rate that the borrower will pay. A borrower can also post images and write a free-
format description to accompany the listing. Neither the image nor the text is verified by 
the website. Borrowers choose an auction format. Closed auctions close as soon as the 
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total amount bid reaches the amount sought at the borrower's asking rate. In the open 
format, the auction remains open even after the entire amount requested is funded for up 
to 7 days. During this period, lenders continue to bid down the the interest rate of the loan. 
Figure 2 provides a screenshot of a sample listing. The listing displays 
information from the borrower's credit such as the number of credit inquiries in the 6 
months prior to the listing (number of times that the borrower requested loans from banks, 
or applied for other kinds of credit cards)
2
 , the debt-to-income ratio, and a letter credit 
grade, which is a coarse version of the borrower's FICO score. The credit grade ranges 
from AA (high quality) to HR (low quality) high risk borrowers. The correspondence 
between letter credit grades and the actual FICO score is shown in Table 1.1. During my 
sample period, lenders could not see the borrower's actual score but only the letter grade 
The purpose of a loan is tagged as a field in the listings. The listing indicates information 
about the borrower's friends and groups to which he belongs. With all the above 
information in place, the listing can go live to solicit bids from lenders. 
 
3.3  Bidding 
 
When a lender sees a listing, she can decide whether or not to lend to the 
borrower. An important feature of online peer-to-peer lending is that an individual lender 
does not have to finance the entire loan request. A lender can bid an amount of $50 or 
more and specify the minimum interest rate she desires. The actual bidding process uses a 
proxy bidding mechanism. If the loan has not yet been funded 100%, the ongoing interest 
rate will be the borrower's asking rate, even if the lenders' minimum rate is lower. Once 
100% of the requested funding has been reached and the format of the auction is open, 
                                                 
2
 Note that this is not the number of prior loan requests on Prosper.com.  
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the ongoing rate decreases as the lender with the highest rate-bid is competed out. In a 
sense, the auction is similar to a second-price auction. All bids are firm commitment bids 
and no withdrawals are allowed. From a lender's viewpoint, a bid could win or be outbid, 
in which case the lender can place another bid to rejoin the auction. Once the auction 
ends, the loan could be fully funded. If not, the auction is deemed to have failed and no 
funds are transferred. 
 
3.4  Post-bidding, funding and repayment 
 
Once the bidding process ends, the listing is closed and submitted to Prosper staff 
for further review. Sometimes, additional documentation is required of borrowers. Once 
the review process is completed, funds are collected from the winning bidders' accounts 
and transferred to the borrower's account after deducting fees of up to 2% of the loan 
amount. 
Loans on Prosper.com have a fixed maturity of 36 months with repayments in 
equated monthly installments. The monthly repayment is automatically deducted from a 
borrower's bank account and distributed to lenders' Prosper accounts. If the monthly 
payment is made in time, the loan status for that month is considered current. If a 
monthly bill is not paid, the loan status will be changed to “late”, “1 month late”, “2 
months late”, etc. If a loan is late for 2 months or more, it is sent to a collection agency. 
Lenders on prosper.com must agree that the proceeds of the collection represent the full 
settlement of loans. Delinquencies are reported to the credit report agencies and can 




3.5  Social networks 
 
Any Prosper.com member with a verified email account can create or join a 
friendship network. Friendships are typically created through the following process. After 
the inviting member fills out the friend's email address and a short message, Prosper.com 
generates an email message that contains a link to join Prosper. The recipient can click on 
the link contained in the email to sign up, or use the link to establish friendship with an 
already-registered account. In this regard, the presence of a friendship tie suggests that 
the two individuals have at least some offline, non-public information about each other, 
such as an email address. 
Any member, including these friends, may elect to have no roles or elect to be 
verified as lenders or borrowers. Friendship ties are bi-directional. From an empirical 
viewpoint, a member's friendship network is visible on the profile page or a loan listing 
page. Other members can click through the link to see the profile information of those 
friends. Friends who bid on a listing are also tagged very clearly by a unique icon in the 
list of bids, so they are readily visible to other potential bidders. 
A second type of social network on Prosper.com is a group. There are 4,139 
groups in my sampling period. Any member can create a group and a member can 
typically join any group whose membership criteria are met. However, in my sample, 
each individual can be a member of only one group at a time. Entry or exit into a group is 
free but this bar is raised for borrowers. If a borrower is a member of a group when 
requesting a loan, the borrower cannot leave the group or join any other group until the 
outstanding loan is repaid in full. The leader of each group can determine the rules 
regarding who can become group members and how others may join. Some groups, such 
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as alumni groups, typically require a high degree of verification. Applicants must prove 





My sample comprises all listings that seek funding on Prosper.com between 
January 2007 and May 2008. I obtained information regarding borrower's credit history, 
their unique Prosper ID, the social network variables, features of their auctions, and 
outcome of their loan listings using an API provided by Prosper.com. I ensure that the 
descriptive fields in my analysis are in the information set of potential lenders. For 
instance, I gathered information on loan requests over time, so that information about 
borrowers' social networks is current at the time of the loan requests. I will now describe 
the variables used in my analysis and discuss some descriptive statistics. 
 
4.1  Social networks 
 
In my sample, 56,584 listings report friends, and 41% of all listings are associated 
with a group. The friendship ties and group-based affiliations capture soft information in 
a borrower's social network. As can be seen from the screenshot of listings, information 
about friends that borrowers have a direct link to (first-degree neighbors on the friendship 
network) is much more salient than those who are two-degrees away and beyond. Since 
my focus is the “signaling” value of networks, remote neighbors are unlikely to affect the 
decision of lenders when their information is not directly observable. Therefore in the 
main body of the paper, I focus on network measure calculations based on these 
neighbors. 
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The literature provides two perspectives to understand the effect of social 
networks. The “structural” view emphasizes the topology of the network, while the 
“relational” view emphasizes the nature and quality of ties. Structural aspects of networks 
have received much attention from researchers. While many structural metrics can be 
calculated from my network, only some of them are theoretically justifiable as predictors 
for the three outcomes that I study. The basic metric of degree centrality (undirected) 
captures the number of friends that a borrower has at the time of the listing. It is possible 
that having more friends can be associated with a higher social pressure to repay loans. It 
is also conspicuously displayed on listing pages, hence likely to influence lenders' 
decision to bid. I therefore consider this metric as the basis for my analysis of the 
relational dimension of networks. One other category of structural metrics that could 
have an impact on loan outcomes are those related to network closure, or the degree to 
which friends of a borrower know each other. These ego-network metrics include 
constraint, efficiency, and effective size (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). These measures 
are also likely to impact a borrower's loan outcomes because the news of a default can 
easily diffuse throughout a borrower's social networks, and reputational consequences 
can motivate borrowers to honor their debt. I calculated these metrics in UCINET. 
However, as of the time of my study, the degree of closure in the network is quite low, 
and none of these metrics is consistently significant on three outcomes that I study. This 
structure is also confirmed in exploratory analysis of the largest few components of the 
network. Therefore, I focus on the degree centrality of borrowers as I delve into the 
nature of ties, or the relational aspect of their networks. 
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The relational social network measures concern the roles and identities of the 
members in the network. Figure 1 describes the hierarchical levels underlying my 
analysis. Level 1 distinguishes friends according to whether their identities are verified 
on Prosper versus individuals who have merely registered and are thus little more than a 
verified email address. Level 2 categorizes the verified friends based on their specific 
roles – whether these friends are borrowers or lenders. Lenders are individuals with extra 
financial capital while borrowers are likely to be facing financial constraints. On the other 
hand, borrowers are subject to greater scrutiny as they have verifiable credit grades that 
form a backbone of their listings. Level 3 further differentiates between real lender 
friends – those who have lent prior to the current listing; and potential lender friends – 
those who have provided enough information to Prosper to be listed as lenders but have 
yet to participate in any loan. Level 4 differentiates real lender friends according to 
whether they bid on the specific borrower's listing or not. Level 5, the finest classification, 
distinguishes between lender friends who bid on the borrower's listing and won and those 
who bid but did not win. As I progress from Level 1 to Level 5, the relationship between 
the borrower and lender becomes more actionable, verifiable and more strongly 
embedded. 
In addition to a borrower's friendship ties, I consider membership of groups. I 
manually coded all groups that have at least 3 members and are active in the generation 
of loans. I categorize all groups into one or more of several categories and include 
dummies for groups. Groups can be based on self-identified categorization such as 
membership of a religious denomination or having hobbies of a specific kind. 
Alternatively, they could be based on verifiable antecedents, such as being an employee 
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at a particular company or living in a particular geographic region such as the greater 
Washington DC area. Borrowers can choose what group to belong to but group 
membership cannot be reversed until loans are repaid. I also include controls for group 
size. However, its sign in the regressions is not clear because while larger groups involve 
more peer pressure they also result in less oversight of any one member. An interesting 
group variable is whether the leader of a group is rewarded for listings of group members 
that are successfully funded. These rewards create incentives similar to the originate-sell 
model of intermediaries held responsible for the 2008 financial crisis. This reward 
structure was discontinued by Prosper.com in October 2007. I include a dummy for group 
leader incentives in my analysis. 
Friendship and group networks can benefit the borrowers in two different ways. If 
these networks serve the role of “pipes” (Podolny 2001), borrowers should be able to 
directly obtain resources from their friends or peer group members. These resources 
could be financial (i.e. direct funding from friends or group members), or informational 
(i.e. helping to make the loan request more appealing). If instead, borrowers social 
networks function as “prisms”, then these networks should help the borrowers' signal 
their creditworthiness to potential lenders outside the borrowers' immediate social 
network. Summary statistics of my sample shows that the financial aspect of “pipe” effect 
is likely minimal: the funds contributed by friends or group members to a borrower's loan 
account for less than 5% for over 95% of loans associated with these networks, whereas 
most funding comes from lenders outside the borrowers' social networks. On the other 
hand, to control for the informational aspect of the “pipe” effect, I specifically address the 
potential confounding effects of texts and images in later parts of the paper. 
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4.2  Hard credit information 
 
Prosper.com provides a letter grade for each borrower ranging from AA to HR, 
which correspond to the credit scores listed in Table 1.1. In addition, I include the other 
hard credit information provided by the website, including a borrowers' debt-to-income 
ratio and the number of credit inquires (at banks or credit card companies) in the six 
months prior to the listing. I include these variables as additional credit indicators to 
allow for the possibility that the letter grade itself is not a sufficient statistic for credit risk. 
Rather than a numerical score (e.g., AA=1, A=2, etc.), I include a full set of dummy 
variables for each letter grade. 
 
4.3  Other control variables 
 
In addition to the above soft and hard credit information, I also gather information 
on whether the auction is conducted via the open or closed format. The latter closes as 
soon as it is funded 100% and perhaps indicates borrowers with more urgent financial 
need. I include a dummy for the auction type. I also considered maximum auction 
duration, which could range between 3 and 10 days but has been since standardized to 7 
days. This variable showed little significance in any of my models and I omit it. 
Some states in the US have usury laws that enforce a cap on the allowable interest 
rate on consumer loans. While usury laws intend to protect customers, they could reduce 
the chances of successful funding if the supply curve for funds intersects the demand 
curve at a rate above a state's usury limit. Whether the laws have this bite or not is an 
empirical issue. After April 15 2008, Prosper started collaboration with a bank in an 
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effort to circumvent that limit. My sample spans both periods, so I include a control for 
usury laws. 
Each borrower indicates a maximum borrowing rate that she is willing to pay. I 
include this variable in quadratic format. While low rates indicate less profitable loans, 
high rates could also indicate less profitable loans because the effect of higher rates could 
be swamped by the greater likelihood of default for borrowers willing to pay high rates 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). The setting of an intermediary and the sophisticated reasoning 
modeled in Stiglitz and Weiss is probably far from my setting of atomistic lenders 
bidding for a small piece of a listing. However, I include the quadratic term as a 
hypothetical possibility. 
To control for broad lending rates, I purchased a proprietary dataset from a 
professional company. The data include the average interest rate for borrowers in each 
credit grade in each regional market for each month for 36-month loans. This variable not 
only serves as a proxy for the “outside option” of borrowers and lenders, but also reflects 
temporal and regional variations in consumer lending. 
I further control for the purposes of loans. Borrowers indicate several types of 
needs, including debt consolidation, home improvement, business loans, personal loans 
for a variety of purposes (including vacations), or student or auto loans. The loan purpose 
is self-indicated by borrowers and can thus be thought of as cheap talk. However, 
potential lenders often communicate with borrowers during the auction process and seek 
more tangible details. In balance, there may still be some information in the loan purpose, 
so I include this in the regressions. 
28 
As a new business model, Prosper.com has received significant media exposure 
since its inception. Articles in the media make it more likely to attract new borrowers and 
lenders to the website after their publication. To control for the potential influence of 
such news, I include an additional variable to absorb these exogenous shocks to this 
marketplace. I download the search volume on Google for Prosper.com and construct a 
dummy variable based on whether there is a significant change in search volume, which I 
call spikedays. Finally, I include quarterly dummy variables to control for unobserved 
time effects. 
 
5. Empirical Modeling and Identification 
 
The theoretical motivation for my study comes from Akerlof (1970) style adverse 
selection models. Because both borrowers and lenders in the P2P market are small and 
must make their lending decisions in the face of considerable informational asymmetry, 
lenders are likely to use several informational cues or “signals” for their lending 
decisions. While hard credit variables (e.g., a borrower's credit score) are well-known 
signals of a borrower's quality, it is not known whether (and if so, what aspects of) a 
borrower's social network can serve as an additional signal of quality in this market. The 
main hypothesis that I examine is whether a borrower's social network helps agents adapt 
to this environment by acting as informational cues of borrower quality. If so, the basic 
testable hypothesis is that social networks should be associated with an increased chance 
of a successful listing and should reduce the interest rates of consummated loans. 
Affirmative evidence would be consistent with the joint hypothesis of an economic model 
in which (i) investors rationally adapt to informational asymmetry by relying on other 
informational cues of borrower credit quality; and (ii) networks provide such a cue. 
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The first set of tests described above rely on differences between borrowers with 
friendship networks and those without. If the hypothesis that friendship networks act as 
informational cues of borrower quality is correct, transactional outcomes should not 
depend on just friends per se, but also on the  type of individuals that comprise the 
friendship network. The empirically testable proposition is that the network effects on 
both transactional outcomes should be especially pronounced when borrowers have better 
“quality” friends. My tests on the friendship hierarchy of borrowers represent precisely 
this test of differences in the “quality” of friends a borrower has. I test whether the 
network results are stronger when friends have verifiable antecedents, whether the 
antecedents reflect roles as lenders, the subset of lenders who actually bid, and the subset 
who bid and lend. I test whether the relation to transactional outcomes – successful 
listings and lower interest rates – strengthens as I progress down the hierarchy of 
friendship quality. In sum, the adverse selection theories predict not only that networks 
should matter but also that they should do so for stronger cues of quality, a proposition 
that I take to the data in a sequence of specifications 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that networks act as informational cues to mitigate 
adverse selection results in yet another hypothesis. If networks are incrementally 
informative about borrower credit quality, the testable implication is that they should also 
be associated with lower ex-post defaults in funded loans. Furthermore, the effects of 
friendships on loan defaults should also follow the gradation discussed in the funding 
probability and interest rate tests. Better quality friendships that delve deeper into the 
hierarchy in Figure 1 should have greater effects in reducing loan defaults. I test both 
implications by tracking ex-post repayment histories of borrowers with successful listings 
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and model the time to default using a flexible Cox hazard model. This test has the major 
empirical advantage that it is an out of sample test of the adverse selection hypothesis. 
The test is implemented on an entirely disjoint database far removed from the 
transactional data on loan funding or interest rates. 
Endogeneity is a common concern in empirical modeling. One source of such 
concerns is reverse causality. This is unlikely in my context. Many prior studies of peer 
effects (e.g. Kremer and Levy 2003) reflect the “pipe” effects of networks: outcome such 
as drinking behavior could be a direct result of peers' actions, either through imitation or 
social pressure. Reverse causality is plausible in these studies because of homophily: 
individuals with the same behavioral patterns are also more likely to form ties. By 
contrast in my study, the outcome of interest is largely a result of the actions of those 
outside the agent's immediate network (friendship ties). Furthermore, because all 
operational transactions such as fund transfers and ex post monitoring of repayments are 
carried out by Prosper.com, there is little interaction between borrowers and lenders after 
loans are originated. Friendship motivation for lending is unlikely. Empirically, reverse 
causality is not a concern either. All loans on Prosper.com are three-year loans and most 
in my sample are first-time borrowers on Prosper. Even when borrowers and lenders do 
become friends online, it is not likely the result of previously repaid loans, as the time 
frame in my anaylsis does not allow such reciprocity to occur. 
A second concern is the role of unobservables. Do my estimates truly reflect the 
effect of friendship variables or other unobservables? My research context makes this 
about as unlikely as reasonably possible in social studies with nonexperimental data. In 
my study, loans are funded by aggregated contributions from many small lenders, 
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virtually all of whom are strangers with no private information about the creditworthiness 
of the borrowers. Hence, if a certain variable is unobservable to me, it is also 
unobservable to potential lenders and will not affect their behaviors. This identification 
strategy is consistent with Angrist (1998), who writes that he has access to information 
about “most of the characteristics used by the military to screen applicants,” and is thus 
able to eliminate bias due to unobservables. My study has a similar or even stronger 
settings given that I observe and control for all information available to potential lenders. 
As abundance of caution, I consider additional tests to further mitigate concerns 
about unobservables. I not only include an exhaustive set of controls that could predict 
loan defaults, but also go beyond and include non-standard variables derived from the 
text and images of loan listings. Loan listings on Prosper.com often contain images and 
some descriptive text attached to the loan listings. Because these variables are self-
reported, it is not immediately clear that they could subsume the information content of 
friendships, and particularly the grades of friendships based on the roles of friends. Those 
variables are either verified by the website or based on a clearly verifiable trail such as 
bids or participation in prior listings. Nevertheless, I consider the effect of text and 
images in my analysis through two approaches. First, I separately analyze listings with or 
without images on Prosper.com. About half the listings in prosper post no images. To 
assess the sample with images, I randomly sample 10% of listings with images, and 
manually code the image content. Finally, I examine subsamples with descriptive text in 
listings and code the text content using disambiguation routines in the text analysis 
literature. These additional variables have little effect on my key results on networks or 
their relational grades based on the hierarchy of roles and identities of friends. 
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6. Results and Discussion 
 
From the raw data described above, I construct two datasets for the three 
outcomes of my interest. For the funding probability and interest rate, I construct a 
dataset where each record is a loan request
3
. For the riskiness of loans, I construct a panel 
dataset where the unit is a funded loan, and each time period is one billing cycle. I then 
track the repayment history of all funded loans in the first dataset at each billing cycle. 
Overall, my sample has 205,132 listings with an average loan amount of $6,973. Of these, 
56,584 (27.58%) report friends while 148,548 (71.42%) report no friends. The group of 
listings in which borrowers have friends is spread across the Prosper.com credit grade 
spectrum. For instance, of the 6,523 AA listings, 1,881 or 28.84% have friends, while of 
the 33,068 D grade listings, 9,462 or 28.61% have friends. In the high risk, or HR 
category, 22,556 out of 62,904 listings, or 26.39%, are associated with a friend. Listings 
in which borrowers have no friends have mean debt-to-income ratios of 58% while 
listings of borrowers with friends have debt to income ratios of 57%. Borrowers with no 
friends have about 4.17 credit inquiries (credit applications to banks or credit card 
companies) in the six-month period prior to the listing date against 4.22 inquiries for 
borrowers with friends. 
In my data, 16,500 (8.04%) listings attract full funding. For the sample of 
borrowers with no friends, 10,410 out of 148,548 listings, or 7.04% are successfully 
funded, while 6,090 or 10.76% of listings where borrowers have friends are successfully 
funded. My other social network variable is group membership. 29% of all requests or 
59,978 listings indicate a group affiliation. Of this sample, 28,006 listings, or 46.63%, are 
                                                 
3
 I subjected this dataset to different structures in my robustness tests, which I will describe later. 
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associated with an incentive structure in which group leaders are rewarded with a fee for 
successful listing.Likewise, 7.09% of listings not affiliated with a group are successfully 
funded, while 10.36% of listings with a group affiliation are funded. 
To reiterate, my main research question is whether borrowers' online social 
networks can help mitigate information asymmetry in the P2P market. To this end, I need 
to study how network metrics relate to the three outcomes and if these relationships taken 
together are indeed consistent. I examine loan funding probability, interest rates and loan 
default in multivariate specifications. Table 1.2 provides a full list of the explanatory 
variables. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 describe the different models that I report in the paper and 
the set of variables used in each specification. For instance, specification P1 is a model of 
funding probability that uses variable set 1 (Table 1.3). From Table 1.4 I can see that 
variable set 1 corresponds to the root level of the friendship hierarchy and uses 
“ttlfriends”, or the number of friends plus the “common variables” listed in Table 1.2 as 
explanatory variables. Section 5.1 reports the probit results while Sections 5.2 and 5.3 
model the interest rate of funded loans and the probability of default. Each section 
focuses on the results relating to social network variables. Section 5.4 discussed the 
coefficients for control variables. 
 
6.1  Funding probability 
 
Table 1.5 reports estimates of a probit model for the probability that a listing is 
successfully funded. I report six sets of results that include the social network variables in 
Figure 1 and common controls. I discuss the social network coefficients first and then 
examine the results for the control variables. As I will discuss further in the “robustness” 
section, results are consistent when I use a logit regression. Probit results are reported 
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here because I can easily compare with the first stage of the Heckman model for interest 
rates. 
 
6.1.1  Social networks: Friendship network 
 
I will start by considering structural measures of networks. The degree centrality 
measures a borrower's position in the friendship network. Specification P1 in Table 1.5 
shows that degree centrality is positively related to the probability of being funded. As I 
shall explain below, this relation reflects a more extensive relation caused by the roles 
and identities of the members of the friendship network. And as discussed earlier, other 
structural network measures such as effective size of network and efficiency have no 
significant effects on the probability of funding, largely due to the low degree of closure 
in the friendship network. 
Specification P2 in Table 1.5 distinguishes friends according to whether their 
identities are verified on Prosper or not. This process effectively decomposes a 
borrower's degree centrality into two orthogonal pieces, friends who are verified and 
those who are not. I find that unverified connections, i.e., connection that merely signify 
a valid email address, represent insignificant cheap talk or even negative signals at the 10% 
significance level. In contrast, TTLROLE, which denotes friends with verified roles, has 
a positive coefficient that is significant at 1%. These results constitute the first evidence 
that roles and identities, or the nature of the company that borrowers keep, matter. 
I next categorize friends based on their roles on Prosper.com. To this end, I 
decompose the verified friends into two orthogonal and additive pieces: friends with roles 
as borrowers and those with roles as lenders, both adding up to the total number of 
friends with roles. In addition to these two components of friends with roles, I also 
35 
include the total number of friends with no roles. Specification P3 gives the results. 
Friends with no verified roles have negative effects as before. Connections to borrowers 
have insignificant effects while having friends with roles as lenders increases the 
probability of the loan being funded. 
Specification P4 further differentiates between real lender friends, who have 
made loans on Prosper.com prior to the current listing, and potential lender friends who 
have not yet made loans on Prosper.com prior to the start of the current listing. I continue 
to include the excluded variables, all friends with no roles, and friends who are borrowers 
but not lenders as control variables. There is a continued gradation of the friendship 
effects. Having lender-friends matters only to the extent that the friends are real lenders 
who have already bid. The coefficient almost doubles relative to that of the total number 
of lender friends. 
Specification P5 reports results when I decompose the real lender-friends into the 
ones who bid on the specific borrower's listing and ones who do not. At this level, it is 
also possible that a potential lender who has not lent in the past now chooses to initiate 
bidding with the current loan. Thus, I decompose both potential lenders and real (past) 
lenders into ones who bid on the current listing and ones who do not. I find positive and 
significant effects for potential lenders who bid on the current listing. Interestingly, 
borrowers with potential lender-friends who do not bid on the listing are less likely to get 
funded. In contrast, having real lender-friends bid on a listing elevates the chances of a 
successful funding. The funding probability equation does not decompose real bidders 
into those who win and those who lose because whether a bidder wins or not is 
observable only after the outcome is known. 
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In sum, I find that social capital, as reflected in borrowers' social networks, 
matters in attracting outside financial capital. In this regard, the structural aspects of the 
social networks are not necessarily critical. Rather, the role and identity of the network 
members are important. It is interesting that social capital matters even when the outside 
lenders are atomistic individuals participating in arm's-length transactions with the 
individuals possessing the social capital. 
 
6.1.2  Groups 
 
I next test whether group variables matter. Proceeding as before, I first consider 
group size, measured as the natural logarithm of number of members in a group. In 
specifications P1 through P4, larger groups are less likely to result in a successful listing. 
Perhaps the effect of default of a group member on the overall group credit quality 
declines when the membership is very high. Alternatively, members who choose to 
belong to a larger group are voluntarily foregoing membership of a smaller group, 
recognizing which potential lenders may become less willing to fund a listing. The group 
size variable loses significance in specifications P5 and P6. In terms of group type, 
university alumni groups and geography-based groups increase chances of funding. 
Membership of these groups is based on verifiable antecedents rather than self-reported 
identification. Interestingly, borrowers with religious affiliation are more likely to be 
funded. Perhaps individuals with religious affiliations default less. Alternatively, this 
could reflect tastes for lending to people with religious affiliations, in the spirit of the 
taste-based discrimination hypothesis (Becker 1971). I examine this issue in Section 5.3, 
which deals with loan defaults. 
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6.2  Interest Rates 
 
Section 6.1 shows that social network variables increase the probability of 
successful funding. I next examine whether these variables have complementary price 
effects. I regress interest rates on social network variables and controls. I control for the 
fact that interest rates are only observed when listings are successfully funded by using 
the familiar two-step method of Heckman (1979). The model can be identified either 
through the non-linearity intrinsic to selection models (an example can be found in Uzzi 
1999) or through exclusion restrictions, and the results are similar. For exclusion 
restriction, I consider the variable SPIKEDAYS: when Prosper.com received media 
exposures, traffic volume to the site will increase significantly. Borrowing activities will 
increase, but lending will respond slower as lenders need to verify their bank accounts 
and transfer funds (which takes up to a week) before they can place bids. Hence 
SPIKEDAYS should be negatively associated with funding probability; meanwhile, 
interest rate should be more stable and determined by borrowers' credit circumstances. 
Empirically, this variable has an F -statistic exceeding 50, well above the cutoff of 10 for 
a strong instrument suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The results with the exclusion 
restriction are reported in Table 1.6; they are also highly consistent with those estimated 
without using any variable as exclusion restrictions. 
The interest rate results in Table 1.6 are remarkably consistent with those for 
funding probability and default rates. The variables reflecting the role and identity of 
network members show a direction and gradation consistent with the results for funding 
probability. Connections to friends not verified by Prosper.com tend to increase interest 
rates, as reflected by the coefficient for the variable ttlNoRole. More importantly, 
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connections to verified friends with lender roles have the opposite effect. Both 
connections to real lenders and those to potential lenders lower interest rates. Interest 
rates fall the most when real lender-friends who have participated in past loans on 
Prosper.com and also participate in the current listings. The effects are significant 
regardless of whether they win in the listing or not. 
Interestingly, group variables also explain interest rates in a fashion largely 
consistent with the funding probability model. The group size itself has marginal 
statistical significance and little economic significance in explaining interest rates. The 
nature of the group matters more. Groups with a religious motif enjoy lower interest rates 
by between 70 and 200 basis points. Geography-based groups are consistent in models 
H1--H4 but not in models H5--H6. Groups based on business or university alumni 
affiliations, which tend to have verifiable criteria, show strong effects, lowering interest 
rates by close to 120 basis points. 
 
6.3  Loan defaults 
 
Prosper.com records the status of loans in each month, or payment cycle. Loans 
are current if repayments occur on time. Otherwise, loans can be “late,” “1 month late,” 
“2 months late,” and so on. I model a default as occurring if a payment is late by at least 
two months. As in the consumer finance literature (e.g, Gross and Souleles, 2002), I 
estimate survival models. I employ a Cox proportional hazards model (e.g. Grover, 
Fiedler and Teng 1997; Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara, Marsden and Telang 2007; 
Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez and Marchenko 2008) in which the hazard )(th  is specified as  
 )()(=)|( 0 xexpthxth                                          (1) 
 
 where )(0 th  is a baseline hazard rate, and x  denotes a vector of covariates. For each 
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covariate jx  in the Cox model, I report the exponentiated form of the coefficient  , 
which is called the hazards ratio, whose standard error is obtained using the Delta 
method (Cleves et al 2008, page 133). A hazards ratio greater than 1.0 for variable jx  
indicates that it increases the probability of default, while a ratio less than 1.0 indicates 
that jx  decreases the probability of default. The smaller the ratio, the greater the effect on 
reducing the risks of default. The Cox hazards model estimates of   can be used to 
recover estimates of the baseline hazard function (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002; Cleves 
et al 2008). As shown in Figure 3, the baseline hazard of default increases sharply at the 
beginning, reaching a peak at about 10 months, and then slowly wears off. This pattern is 
remarkably consistent with consumer lending delinquencies reported in Gross and 
Souleles (2002, page 327). 
Table 1.7 reports exponentiated estimates of coefficients   in equation (1). In 
specification C1, the total number of friends is insignificant as a predictor of default. 
Specification C2 decomposes friends into those with verified identities as lenders or 
borrowers and friends with no verification. Having more unverified friends increases the 
odds of default, as indicated by a hazards ratio of 1.05, while friends with verified 
identity decrease the odds of default. However, neither variable is significant. 
Specification C3 shows statistically significant effects for verified lender friends in a 
borrower's social network. The hazards ratio of 0.91 suggests that having lender-friends 
decreases default risk by 9% on average. 
Specification C4 includes the number of lender-friends but controls for whether 
they actually participated in lending prior to the borrower's listing. The hazards ratio for 
real lender-friends is 0.88, indicating that having real lender-friends decreases the odds of 
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default. Likewise, the hazards ratio is 0.86 when when I consider lender-friends who bid 
on the borrower's listing. Both coefficients are significant at 1%. The hazards ratio for 
friends who bid on and win a listing is 0.79 and is significant at 1%. Thus, the odds of 
default are significantly lower when lender-friends bid and win on the borrower's listing. 
The result for the real lenders who bid indicate that financial stakes taken by 
friends are strong signals for outside lenders that a borrower is creditworthy. 
Alternatively, perhaps peer pressure is generated when friends take stakes in a borrower's 
listing. The data suggest that this is not a first order force because the median 
contribution of friends to a listing is less than 5%. The evidence is more consistent with a 
prism effect in which borrowers' attributes are reflected in the nature of the company they 
keep, i.e., serve as a source of soft information about borrower quality. Equivalently, the 
positive social capital communicated by friends who bid appears to be the major reason 
why social networks reduce defaults. 
In terms of group characteristics, Table 1.7 shows that only two matter for loan 
performance, alumni groups and geography-based groups. Being members of these 
groups reduced the probability of default. Interestingly, both groups do not rely on self-
categorization for membership but rely on verification to establish membership. None of 
the other groups are related to default risk. Group size is also unrelated to loan defaults. 
 
6.4  Controls 
 
While Sections 5.1--5.3 focus on the role of social networks, I now turn to the 
major results for control variables. In terms of hard credit variables, credit ratings, the 
number of credit inquiries, and the debt to income ratio have the expected sign. For 
instance, listings with more recent credit inquiries (applications to credit card companies 
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or banks), or with lower credit grades, are less likely to be funded, attract higher interest 
rates, and are more likely to default. Bank card utilization has a positive coefficient while 
its square has a negative coefficient in all three specifications. Some card utilization is 
beneficial as it signals creditworthiness. Very high utilization is undesirable because it 
signals stretched borrowers vulnerable to shocks and leads to lower funding probability 
and higher interest rates. 
Auctions that close immediately when funding reaches 100% can encourage 
aggressive early bidding, enhancing funding probability but result in higher interest rates 
because there are no opportunities for lenders to bid down the interest rate. The results in 
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 support this view: closed auctions result in higher funding probability 
and higher interest rates. A closed auction may be indicative of weaker borrowers who 
are willing to forgo price competition, which could result in increased default rates. 
However, the hazard ratio for auction format is not significantly different from 1.0 in any 
of my specifications. 
In the funding probability models, three types of loan purpose variables are 
significant. Business loans (listingcatg4) appear to be viewed as being more risky. These 
are less likely to be funded and when funded, attract higher interest rates. These loans are 
also about 24% more likely to default, though the result is only significant at the 10% 
level. Debt consolidation loans (listingcatg1) are more likely to be funded than other 
loans at lower interest rates, indicating that lenders value the fact that borrowers are using 
Prosper.com to shop interest rates or limit credit card debt. However, there is no 
guarantee that borrowers will necessarily adhere to their plans successfully. Debt 
consolidation loans are about as likely to default as other loans. Specifying some purpose, 
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category increases the overall probability of funding and lowers interest rates but has 
little effect on default. 
Borrowers willing to pay low rates may be less profitable to lenders and may be 
less likely to be funded. However, in the spirit of credit rationing theories, high rates may 
signal risky borrowers, who may also be less likely to be funded. The results in Table 1.5 
supports this view. The linear term has a positive coefficient and the quadratic term has a 
negative sign, as predicted. While rationing theories argue for linear and quadratic terms 
in the funding probability equation, it is less obvious that there is a similar implication for 
the loans that are actually funded. The linear interest rate term is negative in four 
specifications and positive in two others while the squared term is consistently positive in 
all models. In unreported results where I estimate with the linear term alone, I find a 
positive and significant coefficient. 
I also examine the effect of usury laws. In states with usury law limits on interest 
rates, riskier borrowers screened out of other credit markets may seek to come to 
Prosper.com, in which case lenders may perceive these borrowers as being riskier. The 
results in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 suggest that this is the case. Lenders are wary of borrowers 
from usury law states, who are less likely to get funded and when funded, pay higher 
interest rates. While the survival model point estimate for the usury law state coefficient 
is greater than 1.0, the difference is not significant. Group leader incentives matter. When 
group leaders have financial incentives for promoting listings, the listings are more likely 
to be funded, face lower interest rates, but are not less likely to default. I also test for 
potential effects of other variables that have marginal significance at best. An interesting 
variable is the number of years since a borrower's first credit line, a proxy for the 
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borrower's age and credit experience. It has small effects on the funding probability and 
interest rate and no effect on default. 
 
7. Robustness Tests 
 
To examine the robustness of my findings, I conducted a large number of 
additional tests. I discuss the main results, especially the implications for social network 
variables, below. A full set of results is available from the authors but the results are 
qualitatively discussed below. 
 
7.1  Additional Specifications 
 
I first consider different alternative specifications for the funding probability 
model. A logit regression yields highly consistent results as the reported Probit 
regressions. In addition, borrowers whose listings have failed can relist on Prosper.com 
with a fresh request, inducing correlations across listings. I thus constructed a panel 
dataset with each member as a unit, and each listing as a time period. The resulting panel 
is highly unbalanced because 53% of members post only one listing. Due to the 
incidental parameters, I cannot estimate a fixed effect conditional probit model (Greene 
2002). Hence I test a random effects probit model. An alternative specification is a fixed-
effect logit model. Both specifications yield highly consistent results. I further consider a 
“survival” specification in which I model the number of listings that a borrower needs to 
post before getting funded for the first time: Reversing survival terminology, a “failure” 
occurs when the borrower is able to obtain their first loan on Prosper.com. I estimate the 
time to failure using a Cox proportional hazards model. My main results do not change 
under this approach either. 
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Results are also qualitatively consistent when I only analyze the subsample of 
borrowers who only have one loan. This provides further evidence that the number of 
friends is not likely a result of previous loan outcomes on Prosper.com, which could have 
been a concern for endogeneity. Another potentail concern is the performance of past 
loans on Prosper.com. However, most loans are still being repaid, and those who have 
defaulted on a Prosper.com loan will not be allowed to borrow again. Adding an 
additional variable for the performance of past loans does not meaningfully change my 
results either. 
While Prosper.com requires loan requests to be 100% funded to be considered 
successful (i.e. no partial funding), I nonetheless tested “extent of funding” as an 
alternative dependent variable to funding probabilities. This is the ratio of total 
(committed) bid amount received to the requested loan amount. Since this is a proportion 
censored at 0 and 1, I estimated a Tobit model. Results are also highly consistent with 
those reported in my paper. 
For the interest rate of funded loans, I also tested “interest rate discount” as an 
alternative dependent variable for open-format auctions. This is measured as the 
difference between the maximum interest rate that the borrowers specified in the listing, 
and the actual interest rate that they paid when loans are originated. Results are also 
highly consistent with those reported previously. 
I further consider other social capital variables. The online network formed by 
borrowers has many disjoint components with little overlap between friendship and group 
networks. The friendship network is star shaped and exhibits little closure considered 
important in structural analyses of networks (Coleman 1988; Burt 2005), strengthening 
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the case for looking at the roles and identities to gauge the effects of social capital. I also 
consider the number of endorsements received by borrowers. This variable is cheap talk. 
Unsurprisingly, it is insignificant. My previous work examines bids from friends. It is 
also possible that bids from other members in a borrower's group can help reduce the risk 
of loans. I do not find evidence for these group member bidding effects. One variable that 
does matter is the number of friends' defaults in a borrower's neighborhood (ego network). 
The results indicate that a higher number of defaults in a neighborhood of a borrower is 
associated with higher risk of the ego's loan (Cohen-Cole and Duygan-Bump, 2008). 
 
7.2  Images and Text 
 
Individuals seeking funding on prosper.com can upload images and add 
descriptive text to their listings. A priori, it is not clear whether the social network 
variables I study should be entirely subsumed by image and text data. The social network 
variables are verified to varying degrees while the image and text data are self-reported 
fields not authenticated by Prosper.com. On the other hand, borrowers with higher quality 
friends (e.g. those more familiar with Prosper.com) may leverage friendships to post 
more persuasive text or images that might do a better job at attracting funding. The actual 
role played by text or images is an empirical issue that I examine next. To maintain focus, 
this section only report the coefficients for the social network variables. The coefficients 
for the text and image variables are available to the reader upon request. 
 
7.2.1  No-Image Sample 
 
Close to half the listings on Prosper.com post no images. I consider the role of the 
social network variables in the subsample without image data. All key social network 
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variables – friends, friends who are potential lenders, real lenders, or real lenders who bid 
on listings – remain significant in the no-image subsample. Due to page limitations, I 
present the results for this subsample in a supplemental appendices (available upon 
request). 
 
7.2.2  Subsample With Images 
 
While the no-image sample results are quite suggestive, it is still perhaps useful to 
estimate the effects of social networks in samples with images. I experiment with but 
discard results from automatic image processing software because these are not reliable. I 
manually code the data. Because of the high costs of manually coding the entire sample, I 
focus on subsamples. One subsample comprises a random 10% of the funded and 
unfunded listings. To ensure representativeness, I preserve the proportions of successful 
listings, credit grades, and the degrees of relations depicted in Figure 1. A second 
subsample consists of all 16,500 funded listings. In the 10% random sample of 20,513 
listings, 15,928 post images, of which 7,986 contain images of adult humans. In the 
sample of 16,500 funded loans, 10,198 listings have images, of which 8,279 listings 
contain images of adult humans. I hire assistants to code objective aspects of the data 
including race, age, and gender. I implement extensive screens to ensure output quality, 
details of which are available to readers upon request. 
To provide context, I discuss univariate statistics and then turn to the regression 
results. 14.55% of the random 10% subsample of all listings have images of blacks, while 
the proportion of blacks in the funded loans is only about 8.79%. Thus, blacks are less 
likely to be funded, as in Pope and Sydnor (2008) and Ravina (2008). The differences for 
other minority racial groups are less significant. 6.20% of listings are Asian and 4.75% 
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are Hispanic, while these populations represent 6.91% and 4.21% of loans funded. 
Females form 30% of the listings but 37% of all funded loans, suggesting that women are 
more likely to attract funding. Young people below 25 form 23% of all listings but 19.33% 
of all funded loans. Older people of age 50+ form 6.65% of the listings but only 6.24% of 
the funded loans. These univariate statistics may reflect unobserved correlations. For 
instance, younger people may have less credit history or lower credit grades. I consider 
multivariate specifications to evaluate these issues. More importantly, these models test 
the effect of images on the coefficients for the social network variables. 
I briefly discuss the key results for the image variables first. Listings with images 
of older people of age 50+ and those with images of black adults are less likely to be 
funded at the 5% and the 10% levels, respectively. Blacks pay between 40 and 50 basis 
points more in interest rates, which is slightly lower than the point estimate of 60--80 
basis points reported in Pope and Sydnor (2008). My estimate is not significant, a finding 
similar to that in Ravina (2008), perhaps because there are fewer observations in the 
sample with race data. As in Pope and Sydnor, I find that blacks are significantly more 
likely to default with a hazards ratio of 1.20 that is significant at 1%. The more 
interesting question is whether images subsume the content of social network variables. I 
find that the standard errors in this set of results exceed the corresponding numbers in 
Figure 4, reflecting a smaller sample size. Nevertheless, the key coefficients are similar 
and show similar gradation depending on the verifiability and visibility of the social 
network variables to outside lenders. Friends with verified roles in Prosper.com, 
especially verified roles as lenders, matter; among these lender friends, those who have 
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participated in prior loans matter more; and the lender friends who bid on the current 
listing matter even more. 
 
7.2.3  Descriptive Text 
 
Over 99% of the listings in my funded sample of 16,500 listings and in the 10% 
subsample of 20,513 listings have additional descriptive text. I examine the role played 
by text, and in particular whether it explains some of the content of the social network 
variables. 
Following Tetlock (2007), I use a disambiguation routine to classify text. I 
employ the program LIWC (Linguistics Inquiry and Word Count) for this purpose. LIWC 
classifies words into five broad categories, which are further divided into 80 (overlapping) 
sub-categories such as basic counts of words, long words, or punctuatation marks as well 
as more complex psychological, social, and personal categories. The classification is 
based on an extensively validated and updated dictionary of words and word stems from 
psychology and linguistics (Slatcher and Pennebaker 2006; Cohn et al 2004; Friedman et 
al 2004). I experimented with several ways of using the LIWC categories and settled on 
using a set of 12 LIWC that represented a non-trivial fraction of the word count and that 
seemed most relevant to lending outcomes. 
On average, funded listings are likely to have more words per listing, shorter 
sentences, more non-dictionary words, use more numerals, more words in the “money” 
subcategory, positive emotion words, more words of certainty and fewer tentative words. 
Most variables, however, do not survive in the multivariate specifications. For instance, 
“money” words are more likely to result in funding and lead to lower interest rates but 
have an insignificant effect on default. On the flip side, quantifiers such as “few” or 
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“many” lower defaults, and “certainty” words increase defaults but these do not matter in 
the funding equation. The key result is that text variables show little of the consistency 
that the social network variables have across the funding probability, interest rate, and 
default specifications. Thus, it is not surprising that even after controlling for text 
descriptions, they key social network coefficients display similar gradation across the 
roles and identities of the members in borrowers' networks. 
I do not necessarily view the text results as a comprehensive verdict on the role of 
linguistic content in determining lending outcomes. Rather, the results suggest that there 
is a difference in how investors process different types of soft information. Self-reported 
information in the text descriptions, which is not authenticated or verifiable by 
Prosper.com, appears to be processed unevenly and less rationally than information in 
social networks, which is perhaps more credible given the extensive verification process 
put in place by Prosper.com. 
 
8. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Developments in Web 2.0 technologies have significantly altered the way in 
which individuals interact and connect with each other. Perhaps the most significant 
outcome of this change is the growth in social networks. Online networks such as 
facebook.com have become ubiquitous in a very short span of time since their inception. I 
study one of the first attempts to build businesses based on networks. I study peer-to-peer 
lending, in which individuals make unsecured loans to other individuals without the 
intervention of financial intermediaries. I find that social networks, especially their 
relational aspects, can help mitigate the information asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders, and lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the lending process. While 
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borrowers are not required to create and maintain these networks online, my results show 
that the overall performance of the marketplace will be improved if networks are better 
integrated into the financing process. 
My findings are of interest from a number of viewpoints. One perspective of my 
study is that it represents data from a credit market in which there is an especially severe 
problem of adverse selection. An interesting question is what mechanisms individual 
agents use to adapt, given that they lack the sophisticated risk assessment methodologies, 
scale economies, or soft information in lending from a broader vector of banking 
relationships that is available to traditional financial intermediaries such as banks. My 
study suggests that soft information is sought and used in credit decisions. Social 
networks act as a new source of “soft” information. 
My study also sheds light on the role of soft information in credit markets. An 
extensive literature in finance argues that credit markets suffer from a problem of adverse 
selection that can be mitigated by soft information. The literature traditionally views 
financial intermediaries as the producers and repositories of soft information. As financial 
markets undergo disintermediation driven by information technology, a natural concern is 
that the loss of soft information produced by traditional intermediaries could adversely 
affect credit flows. My results highlight that this concern may at least be partially 
mitigated. While information technology could supplant some sources of soft information, 
it could also increase its supply by hardening new sources of soft information and making 
it available to lenders. The use of social networks may be seen as one manifestation of 
such an effect. The realization of such benefits, however, depends on the ability to make 
the new information credible and verifiable by lenders in the credit market. 
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My study can also be viewed as new evidence on whether social capital facilitates 
economic exchange, a question of growing interest in information systems, economics, 
finance and management. The P2P lending marketplace offers micro-level data on this 
issue with two significant empirical advantages. One, I have relatively well defined 
measures of social capital, which is identified through social networks. In addition, I also 
have well defined measures of transactional outcomes, viz., funding, interest rates, and 
ex-post default. My results are consistent with the view that relational aspects of online 
social networks can help mitigate information asymmetry, since they are consistently 
associated with these three outcomes. 
My results also point to the avenue by which social capital facilitates economic 
transactions. As Podolny (2001) writes, an individual's network not only acts as “pipes” 
or channels through which information and resources flow, but also as “prisms” or 
informational cues that outsiders use to judge the quality of the individual. In my context, 
the “pipe” effect of social networks can emerge in two ways: (1) Funds directly flow 
from friends to the borrower; and (2) Friends help the borrower to better “package” the 
request for loans, such as using proper descriptions and images in the requests. Neither is 
a valid alternative explanation for my findings: Firstly, for 95% of the loans associated 
with friends or groups in my sample, funds provided by friends or peer group members 
accounted for less than 4.4% of the total loan amount. In other words, most of the funds 
that borrowers obtain are from lenders outside their social networks. Secondly, my results 
hold even after controlling for textual contents and image characteristics. Hence, 
networks matter not because friends provide the funds or information directly; but rather, 
the roles, identities and actions of friends serve as an important signal for other lenders – 
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strangers – to determine the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Borrowers are judged by 
the nature of the company they keep. 
Finally, my results have implications for the design of businesses based on online 
networks. One implication is that such businesses could incorporate and facilitate ease of 
using multiple social network metrics for end-users. In particular, the number of 
connections and their structure may not be sufficient, but the nature of the relations also 
matters. In fact, one could make a reasonable case that P2P markets should incorporate 
functionalities that not only promote interactions among members, but also enable 
borrowers to credibly signal their embeddedness in their social networks to lenders. 
Indeed, Prosper.com has taken steps in this direction in more recent listings where social 
network information is given greater prominence in listings seeking funding. In a similar 
vein, my results show that in addition to friendship networks, groups can also play a 
valuable role in reducing information asymmetries. Thus, increasing the interdependence 
among group members and making these ties verifiable can facilitate capital flows, thus 
enlarging the scope and applicability of microfinance-style mechanisms. █ 
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ESSAY 2: GEOGRAPHY AND ONLINE INVESTMENT DECISIONS: 






The effect of geography on individual and organizational behaviors has long fascinated 
researchers in many disciplines. One consistent pattern is “home bias” – interactions are 
more likely to occur between those who are from the same geographical area. Empirical 
evidence of this phenomenon, however, has been mostly cross-sectional. Studies on 
dyadic level interactions are further plagued by the sparseness of transaction networks, 
and many papers resort to specialized statistical procedures or data reduction techniques. 
Endogeneity in the geography variable is also a potential concern. In this paper, I exploit 
a unique natural experiment in an online peer-to-peer lending market, where one side of 
the market (lenders) was artificially constrained to one geographic area, while the other 
side (borrowers) was open to almost all US states. This provides a unique context to 
study how geography affects investor decisions on the dyadic level. In particular, I study 
whether lenders tend to lend to borrowers from their home state. I find that while on 
average, having such geographical ties with lenders increases the chances of receiving a 
bid, such benefits only accrue to high-quality borrowers. I attribute this “bias” to the 
emotional side of investor decisions. Nonetheless, such bias is also intricately related to 
rational lending criteria. I further show that the effect of economic distance dominates 
that of spatial distance.  The virtual nature of electronic markets does not completely 




Are economic transactions more likely to occur between entities within a geographical 
area? This question has been widely studied in economics, finance and management. 
Many empirical studies have documented that such “home bias” exists not only on the 
national level – as documented in the international economics literature – but also within 
national boundaries such as trading relationship across states. In many cases, home bias is 
considered an example of market inefficiency or individual irrationality. The presence of 
home bias in investors’ equity holdings, for example, suggests that investors do not 
follow rationality assumptions of classical economics: If they decrease their holdings of 
domestic equity, the return to the overall portfolio could be higher.  A better 
identification and understanding of home bias, therefore, has significant implications for 
market efficiency, competition, and individual behaviors.  
However, most of these studies are conducted on the macro-level, considering 
only the aggregated volume of trade or portfolio holdings.  Very little attention has been 
given to the “alternatives” that exist before these firms and individuals made their 
selections. The micro-level decision processes are usually subsumed by the aggregated 
data. Recent studies (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) delve into organizational dyad level and 
are able to show a home bias in firms’ funding decisions. Meanwhile, a typical challenge 
in these dyad-level studies is the sparseness of the transaction network compared to all 
potential dyads. For instance, if there are 100 buyers and 100 sellers in the market, there 
are over 10,000 possible transaction dyads. Yet the number of actual transactions is 
usually very small, resulting in a lack of power in statistical modeling. Using the 
terminology of network analysis, the “density” of the transaction network is very low.  
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Scholars offer two strategies to deal with this issue. The first is to reduce the 
number of potential transaction dyads (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). However, such data 
reduction needs to be carefully justified – if a venture capitalist is faced with requests 
from 100 possible entrepreneurs, and the investment is made only to 2, why should I only 
consider several out of the 98 who do not get funded? An alternative is to resort to 
statistical procedures such as rare-event logit (Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003). Nevertheless, rare-event logit requires knowledge of census-level 
proportions to correct for sampling biases (King & Zeng, 2001; Tomz, King, & Zeng, 
2003). Relying on stringent statistical assumptions and data reduction techniques can 
unfortunately cast doubt on the robustness of home bias in dyad-level transactions.  
To further investigate whether “home bias” is a robust phenomenon, I exploit a 
unique natural experiment in the online peer-to-peer lending marketplace, Prosper.com. 
This is the same context as the first essay of the dissertation. Due to government 
regulations, Prosper.com was temporarily closed to borrowers and lenders in May 2008 
as they sought regulatory approval from SEC (Securities and Exchanges Commission). In 
April 2009, Prosper.com obtained SEC's approval; however it was also required to obtain 
further approval from each state before they could service borrowers or lenders from that 
state. California was the first to grant them approval. On April 28th, 2009, Prosper.com 
exited this “quiet period”
4
, but only to a limited scale: While borrowers from virtually all 
over the United States could participate and request loans, only lenders located in 
California were allowed to bid on loan requests. This situation lasted for about 10 days, 
however. On May 8
th
, 2009, Prosper.com suddenly announced that it would halt all 
                                                 
4
 During the “quiet period”, Prosper.com does not accept borrower or lender registrations; existing 
borrowers cannot request loans, and lenders cannot bid on loans. All operations are put on hold. Unfinished 
auctions are cancelled and bids returned to lenders. Prosper.com will also not respond to media requests.  
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operations, enter the “quiet period” again, and request approval from local regulatory 
bodies across the US. Prosper.com users in many third-party discussion boards referred to 
this short period as “mini-Prosper” because of its limited scale.  
This essay of my dissertation exploits this period of time on Prosper.com as a 
natural experiment to test the hypothesis of “home bias” in investors' decision making. 
More specifically, I am interested in whether individual investors in California are more 
likely to lend to borrowers from their home state. If there is a “home bias”, I should 
expect to find that lenders (who are all from California) are more likely to place bids on 
requests from California borrowers.  
This event is an ideal context to study my research question for a number of 
reasons. First, both the opening and closing of this 10-day window is rather unexpected. 
Therefore, the geography (location) of the participating borrowers and lenders is 
exogenously constrained. Unlike other studies, I need not be concerned about the 
movement of individuals in response to regulations because this was a very short period 
of time.  
Second, unlike lab experiments, borrowers and lenders in this market participate 
in auctions with their real credit needs and their real money (where all bids are committed 
bids and cannot be withdrawn), which helps reveal the underlying drivers of their 
behaviors. These borrowers and lenders have also been verified as “real persons” with a 
valid Social Security Number and other identifications.  
Third, as discussed earlier, a common challenge for empirical studies is the 
sparseness of transaction networks, especially when compared to all potential 
connections. In my context, this artificially constrained 10-day marketplace creates a 
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small cohort of borrowers and lenders who interacted and transacted in the online market. 
I observe all incidences of bids between all potential borrower-lender pairs – including 
borrowers who never received any bids. This allows me to very conservatively 
investigate the robustness of home bias on the dyadic level, without resorting to data 
reductions or specialized statistical procedures.  
Last but not least, unlike market access studies (Redding & Sturm, 2008), this 
natural experiment creates an artificial separation of the borrower-side and lender-side of 
the marketplace to study the effect of geography on individual behavior. Geography is 
only constrained on one side of the market, allowing me to attribute the difference to the 
choice of lenders instead of the borrowers.   
For the “home bias” hypothesis, I only focus on the dichotomous measure of 
whether the borrower and lender are from the same state. Continuous measures of spatial 
distance sometimes also yield interesting empirical patterns (e.g. Figure 1 of Sorenson et 
al 2001). Consistent with this literature, I further investigate whether lenders’ likelihood 
of placing a bid decreases as the borrower's distance from California increases. I measure 
borrowers' distance from investors in two ways. The first one is the intuitive geographical 
distance, measured as the driving distance among state capitals. The second approach, 
inspired by Tsang and Yip (2007), is to measure the economic distance between the 
borrower's state and California. This is the difference in per capita GDP. Details of these 
metrics follow later in the paper. 
My results show that “home bias”, a motivation better classified as an 
“emotional” driver for investors, does seem to be robust in my analysis. This result is 
very conservative both because of the “virtual” nature of this online market, as well as the 
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fact that my analysis does not resort to data deductions or sophisticated statistical models 
with stringent assumptions. More interestingly, I find that “home bias” actually exhibits 
an interaction effect with rational aspects of the decision process. Being from the same 
state as the lenders increases the chances of receiving bids for credit-worthy borrowers, 
but surprisingly reduces the chances of receiving bids for low credit-grade borrowers. 
The interplay between emotional and rational motives of investment is a pattern that has 
not been previously identified in the “home bias” literature.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  I briefly review related literature in 
the next section, followed by a description of the context and data gathered from the 
“mini-Prosper” natural experiment. I then describe the empirical models used in my 
analysis. I also report a number of robustness tests, followed by a discussion of some 
limitations of the study. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings 
and some directions for future research.  
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
2.1. Distance and home bias 
 
I draw from two related but largely distinct streams of literature: studies in 
psychology and management where geographic propinquity has been mostly considered 
an emotional driver of decision making; and economic studies of “home bias” in trade 
that attempt to rationalize this phenomenon with transaction costs or other theories. 
Despite different disciplinary jargons, the pattern that interactions (trade, social 
interactions, even referee behavior) are indeed more likely to occur among individuals or 
organizations that are situated within the same boundary.   
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The first stream of research relates to the concept of “homophily” in psychology 
and sociology. Homophily is typically referred to the phenomenon that that individual 
tends to associate, favor, or trust those who are similar to themselves. Its empirical 
evidence has been found on many dimensions of similarity. McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook (2001) provide an extensive review of studies on “homophily”. Geographic 
propinquity is one of the contexts through which homophily can represent itself: 
“Perhaps the most basic source of homophily is space: We are more likely to have 
contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are 
distant.” (page 429) Some studies even show that referees for sporting events favor their 
home teams (Pettersson-Lidbom & Priks, 2010; Sutter & Kocher, 2004). Geographical 
proximity has also been shown to affect organizational innovation (Whittington, Owen-
Smith, & Powell, 2009). It should be noted, however, that much empirical evidence on 
the effect of propinquity has been static and correlational. An important contribution of 
my study is to present further evidence that propinquity, or geographic proximity, indeed 
has a robust effect on outcomes of interest.  
The second stream of literature that informs my empirical analysis is the concept 
of “home bias” in economic geography, as well as related work in finance and 
international economics. Economists have long documented a pattern of transactions: 
Trade, investment, venture capital funding and so on, all tend to occur more frequently 
among those who are within the same border, a phenomenon broadly termed “home 
bias”. More specifically, the role of geography has been studied in a wide range of areas: 
international trade (Boulhol & De Serres, 2010; Disdier & Head, 2008; Overman, 
Redding, & Venables, 2003); intranational trade, or trade within a country’s border 
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(Hillberry & Hummels, 2003; Wolf, 2000); equity investment decisions of individual 
investors(Graham, Harvey, & Huang, 2009; Karlsson & Nordén, 2007), fund managers 
(Cooper & Kaplanis, 1994), venture capitalists (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), and even 
governments (Ahearne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004).  More recently, some researchers 
have started looking beyond the “incidence” of transactions and examine the price effect 
of home bias (Carey & Nini, 2007). As I will describe later, even though I do not have 
complete information about the actual price (interest rate of bids) because Prosper.com 
does not reveal that information unless a bid has been outbid, I am able to examine 
several interesting second-stage outcomes in the bidding process. These include the 
amount of bid that the lender placed on the loan and the timing of the bid (early vs. late). 
Most of these studies, however, use data from offline contexts. Will I observe the 
same “home bias” or effect of distance in the context of electronic commerce, where no 
face-to-face interactions exist? Some studies on the effect of geography touches upon the 
subject by studying how changes in technology may make geography less relevant in 
transaction relationships, such as banks’ lending decisions (Petersen & Rajan, 2002). Yet 
those relations are usually not entirely offline. Another study looks at the effect of 
geography in the online auctions(Hortacsu, Martinez-Jerez, & Douglas, 2009) and found 
that, even though online markets such as eBay help mitigates the deterrence of spatial 
distance, “home bias” persists – even though to a lesser degree compared to prior studies 
of intra-national trade bias (Wolf, 2000).  
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2.2. “Gaps” in the empirics 
 
I now turn to the technical details about the empirical modeling strategies of the 
above two streams of literature, and identify possible gaps that I seek to fill with the 
current study.  These “gaps” include (1) using data only on consummated transactions, 
thereby losing information about alternatives of matching trading partners; (2) aggregated 
transaction volume instead of individual choices; (3) reliance on data reduction 
techniques; (4) reliance on rare-event logit model; and last but not least, (5) potential 
endogeneity in the geography variable. 
The economics geography literature and studies built upon it, such as Hortacsu et 
al (2009), typically draws from the gravity equation (Bergstrand, 1985) in international 
trade. While there are some variations, a typical gravity equation takes the following 
form (Bergstrand, 1985):  
         
    
     
     
      
where the dependent variable is the aggregated volume of trade from region i to region j. 
Yi and Yj are the economy volume of two entities (e.g. two countries), respectively. Dij is 
the spatial distance between these two entities, and Aij refers to other factors that facilitate 
or deter trade. Uij is the error term. The estimation is typically done by taking a logarithm 
of the equation.  
The “equity home bias” literature in finance, as well as the related “consumption 
home bias” literature, takes a slightly different approach. A good review of this macro-
economic view of home bias is Lewis (1999). Research in this literature typically derives 
testable models from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); specifically, “home bias” 
is said to exist when “the proportion of foreign assets held by domestic investors is too 
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small relative to the predictions of standard portfolio theory” (Levy & Sarnat, 1970; 
Lewis, 1999). Researchers have also claimed home bias in a descriptive manner, for 
example, when there are only a small proportion of investors that own foreign assets.  
Graham et al (2009) is one such example.  
While both the gravity equation and the CAPM are well-accepted foundations to 
study home bias or the effect of distance, these models lack the micro foundations of 
economic transactions. More specifically, both the aggregated trade volume and the 
holding of foreign equity are based on observed transactions that are actually completed. 
They fail to consider the choice process of the decision makers, especially what 
alternatives that the buyer/investor had. These alternatives are typically unobservable by 
econometricians. My data, on the other hand, consist of all potential borrowers that the 
investors can lend to during the time window, and what their actual choices are. This 
allows me to conduct a finer level of analysis. Additionally, aggregated data do not allow 
me to distinguish whether the choice is made by buyers or sellers. The unique context of 
my study allows me to focus on just the choice from one side (investors, or buyers of a 
claim) because they are artificially constrained to one geographic area only.  
On the other hand, the management and strategy literature has generally taken a 
different approach in the empirical studies of home bias and the effect of geography. As 
discussed earlier, two approaches are often used by empirical researchers who are 
interested in home bias on dyad-level transactions. The first one is data reduction 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), whereby the researchers strive to filter out at least some 
possible combinations of transaction ties. To illustrate the empirical method used in 
Sorenson (2001), let’s suppose there are M investors (A1, A2, … AM) and N 
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entrepreneurs seeking funding (B1, B2, … BN). Suppose A1 invests in B1 and A2 invests in 
B2, and these are the only actual ties that occurred in the data. Conceptually, (B1, B2, … 
BN) are all possible candidates for A1 and A2, so there are a total of M*N possible dyads. 
To reduce this number, the authors keep only A1-B1, A1-B2, A2-B1, and A2-B2: only the 
start-ups that received funding from another investor are considered as alternatives. This 
allows the authors to reduce the total number of possible dyads from M*N to 4. While 
this dramatically increases the density of transaction network (from 2/M*N to 2/4), a 
great deal of information was lost, and the effects of geography variables could have been 
artificially inflated in this process.  
A second approach often used in the strategic management literature is rare-event 
logit model (Kirsch et al., 2009; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  Rare-event logit was 
originally developed to facilitate the sampling of rare subjects in the population (King & 
Zeng, 1999). For instance, suppose from the census data, I know a priori that a certain 
ethnic group has about 0.005% of the population. So when I conduct surveys about them, 
it will be a lot more economical to over-sample the minority, and then adjust for small 
sample and rare events (e.g. activities within that ethnic group) using this procedure. The 
weighing (parameters in this procedure) should adjust the 0s and 1s to the proportion in 
the population. Unfortunately, many studies that use rare-event logit do not specify the 
weights used. By contrast, “mini Prosper” allows me to use parsimonious logistic models 
to study the incidence of transactions, eliminating the need to resort to rare-event logit 
since I will be using the “population”, the entire set of possible connections.   
Endogeneity, on the other hand, can be common to both the management and the 
economics literature, but has received very little attention in those empirical studies. One 
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possible reason is that geography is typically considered as exogenously given. This 
assumption is questionable, however. Specifically, individuals and organizations can 
strategically choose where to locate their business activities. A recent empirical study that 
highlights this possibility is Parwada (2008). Parwada (2008) examines the determinants 
of fund managers’ location choices – that is, where they choose to locate their firms. 
Hence, geographic information is not entirely exogenous, especially when I study funds 
or venture capitalists. More generally, in the long run, economic production factors 
(labor, capital and so on) tend to gravitate to a location where the marginal productivity is 
highest. This point is echoed in Redding et al (2008) as well.  By contrast, my study 
exploits a natural experiment in which the decision makers are individuals (who are 
unlikely to relocate just to be close to certain borrowers) faced with a very small time 
window (they cannot move even if they wanted to). Concerns for endogeneity can be 
significantly mitigated, if not eliminated.   
 
2.3. Non-dichotomous measures of distance 
 
The discussions above largely focus on a dichotomous measure – that is, whether 
or not the two parties to the transaction are from the same geographical area. Many of 
these studies of geography also consider the actual distance, a continuous variable. For 
instance, the gravity equation in international trade argues that the volume of trade is 
inversely proportional to the physical distance between the nations (Bergstrand, 1985), 
which is a continuous measure. Most strikingly, Sorenson and colleagues (2001) uses 
nonparametric methods to show that (Figure 1 of their paper) the probability of 
investment decreases as the spatial distance between the investor and the start-up 
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increases, albeit at a decreasing rate. These studies motivate me to also examine the role 
of physical distance in the online P2P lending market.  
In addition to the spatial distance, another measure of distance that can play a role 
in determining transaction incidence is Economic Distance (Tsang & Yip, 2007). 
Economic distance is concerned with the difference in the level of economic development 
between two entities. In their paper, Tsang and Yip found evidence that the greater the 
economic distance between two countries, the less likely for foreign investments to 
succeed. It is also plausible that economic distance between states can affect investor 
decisions in the P2P context. For instance, while California is thousands of miles away 
from east coast states, they are still likely to share many similarities such as population 
compositions, political views, and the acceptance toward internet technologies. Hence, 
solely relying on geographical distance may not be sufficient. I therefore also test the 
hypothesis that shorter economic distance between investors and borrowers can increase 
the chances of transaction incidence. In addition, since this is an online context, the 
effects of economic distance can potentially outweigh those of the geographical distance.  
 
2.4. Explanations for home bias 
 
Many studies also attempt to explain the origin of home bias in the empirical 
studies. There are largely two schools of thought: a rational explanation, and an 
emotional/behavioral explanation. Many economists attempt to explain home bias using 
rational criteria, such as transaction costs that include shipping costs and cultural 
differences, cost of information acquisition for international equity investments, and even 
new conceptual framework of the production process that responds to trade costs (Yi, 
2010). Some economists also started to investigate home bias using behavioral 
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approaches, and found over-optimism toward home equity markets in survey data (Lai & 
Teo, 2008; Strong & Xu, 2003).  On the other hand, many studies in sociology and 
management often attribute home bias to factors such as homophily (McPherson et al., 
2001).  
These studies in different disciplines suggest that rational and emotional forces 
can both contribute to home bias, yet there has been little research on how these two 
dimensions interact with each other. It is possible that in most studies it is highly unlikely 
to differentiate these two dimensions of factors. My research context presents some 
unique advantages that allow me to study them at the same time. One such advantage is 
that the proportion of investors who have private information about a potential borrower 
is very small – and it is also captured in my data through borrowers’ social networks. For 
lenders who are strangers to the borrowers, the dataset captures all information that was 
presented to them at the time of the loan request. Rational information such as credit 
grade and so on can be easily quantified, which in turn makes it plausible to attribute the 
remaining, unexplained variance to emotional factors. I will then be able to study how 
these factors interact and affect investor decisions.  
 
3. Context and the “Natural Experiment” 
 
3.1. An overview of Prosper.com 
 
The natural experiment that I exploit in this paper occurred in the same context as 
the first essay of my dissertation, Prosper.com. The first essay of the dissertation has 
provided a detailed description of how Prosper.com works. It should be noted that 
geographic information about the borrower is prominently displayed on the web page 
requesting bids. Each lender decides whether or not to contribute funds to a request. All 
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bids are committed bids: lenders cannot withdraw from the auction process. In other 
words, this is a two-sided market with significant levels of information symmetry.  
The asymmetric information issue inherent in financial lending is especially 
severe in this marketplace because individual lenders do not possess the type of 
sophisticated evaluation techniques that traditional intermediaries have. Hard credit 
information such as credit grades (letter grades indicating the range of FICO scores of the 
borrower at the time of the loan request) is certainly an important criterion that lenders 
will use to screen borrowers. But other information, such as geographic location of 
borrowers, can also play a role. Consistent with the literature surveyed above, I 
hypothesize and test that geographical information also has an impact on the investor's 
decision making, and it can potentially interact with rational factors. In the following, I 
will describe the details of the natural experiment where I collect the data to test the 
propositions above. 
 
3.2. A Natural Experiment for Geographic Information 
 
Prosper.com started lending in 2006 in the United States. Since then, this novel 
business model has increasingly attracted significant media attention and they rapidly 
increase in their size. From the very beginning, the management team at Prosper.com has 
maintained that this website is not a bank or a securities company, but just to provide a 
platform for investors and borrowers to engage in transactions (much like eBay); 
therefore, it does not need to be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). However SEC disagreed. It ordered Prosper.com to shut down in October 2008, 
and fined the website for about $1 Million. Prosper.com complied and entered a “quiet 




, 2008 and the company declined any media contacts, including requests 
from technology bloggers.  
In late-April 2009, Prosper.com obtained the permission from SEC, but was also 
required to further obtain approvals from each and every state in the United States for 
both borrowing and lending operations in its marketplace.  On April 28th, 2009, without 
prior notice, Prosper.com re-opened its doors to borrowers from most states in the United 
States. On the lending side however, only lenders from California were allowed to 
participate as California was the only state to grant their request at that time. Loan 
requests started to appear from all over the U.S., and Californian lenders were allowed to 
bid on the auctions (loan requests). This “Mini-Prosper” continued to operate for about 
10 days when Prosper.com abruptly decided to re-enter the “Quiet Period” on May 8th, 
2009 to obtain further approvals from other states.  
 
3.3. Evidence of Home Bias across Prosper.com 
 
Empirical motivation for my study comes from some high-level statistics on 
Prosper.com, not just activities during the “mini Prosper” period. Between the beginning 
of Prosper.com and the end of March 2009 (before the start of “Mini Prosper”), there 
were 3.7 million bids that became part of actual loans to borrowers. Among these bids, 
about 7% occur between borrowers and lenders of the same state
5
. Considering there are 
50 states, the “naïve” average likelihood that the borrower and lender are from the same 
state is 2% (1/50). Hence, the actual occurrence of same-state lending relationship is 
                                                 
5
 There are 53 state designations on Prosper.com. In addition to the 50 states, AA, AE and AP refer to 
Armed Forces stationed outside of the US. No lenders come from these “states”, and borrowers are very 
few. Bids on these loan requests account for only 0.14% of all bids.  I hence remove them from the 
analyses.  
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about 3.5 times the likelihood in a random network. There does appear to be significant 
home-bias in lending relationships.  
The amount of bid also shows a similar pattern.  I first categorize all bids into 
same-state bids versus different-state bids. A t-test with unequal variance across these 
two groups shows that on average, same-state lenders bid $18 more (where the average 
bid amount in the whole dataset is $88), and the difference is also statistically significant.  
This pattern persists even when I consider the fact that each state has a different 
number of lenders, and the total investments from lenders of each state are also different. 
Virtually in all states (except SD where there is no borrower recorded in the data), the 
share of home-state lender in the amount received by the state’s borrowers exceeds these 
lenders’ investment share in the entire marketplace (Table 2.1). For instance, up until 
April 2009, Texas lenders contributed 8.24% of all loans made on Prosper.com. They, 
however, account for 10.82% of all loans made to Texas borrowers. The same pattern 
exists when I calculate the share of bids (count) placed by home-state lenders, and 
compare it to the ratio in the overall market (Table 2.2). 
These macro-level statistics, however, are not definitive evidence of home bias – 
they do not consider the choice faced by investors at the time of the loan (other borrowers 
that they choose not to lend to), and there could be potential herding among lenders 
across different states. In addition, studying dyad level interactions on the entire market 
will be virtually impossible. With over 200,000 borrowers and a similar number of 
lenders, the total number of potential combinations will be astronomical. The “natural 
experiment” of mini-Prosper, however, provides an ideal context to study home bias on a 
finer level.   
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4. Data and Empirical Models 
 
During this 10-day window, there were 547 borrowers seeking loans in 701 
listings, and 656 lenders (all from California) placing bids. Out of the total 358,832 
possible bid-dyads (547 * 656), 3540 bids actually occur. When a borrower posts 
multiple loan requests during this window, I combine information from these listings for 
statistical analyses.  
I first present some “macro”-level evidence of “home-bias” in investor decisions. 
Out of the 701 listings, 94 listings or 13.4% were from California borrowers. By 
comparison, during this window, 29 loans reached 100% funding. Five of these (17.24%) 
were for California borrowers. If I look at the total amount funded in these loan requests, 
the total amount funded is $84236, out of which $19636 (23.3%) was for California 
borrowers. Furthermore, in terms of interest rate, CA borrowers' average interest rate on 
these loans is 11.58%, while borrowers from other states pay an average of 15.21% in 
interest rate.  
These macro-level summary statistics are similar to the “trade volume” 
descriptions in international trade literature: It appears that California borrowers 
benefitted disproportionately due to the market constraint. This however, only gives me a 
high-level overview without consideration of the characteristics of individual borrowers 
and lenders. I now delve into this issue, and conduct analysis at the level of borrower-
lender dyads instead of aggregated bidding activities described above.   
The main outcome variable that I study in this paper is whether or not a lender 
places a bid on a borrower's loan request. As mentioned earlier, all bids placed on 
Prosper.com are committed bids – they cannot be withdrawn by lenders. Hence, even 
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though some bids were refunded to lenders when “mini Prosper” was terminated, the 
action of the lenders to place bids is still of significant interest. My goal is to look at each 
possible borrower-lender dyad, and test whether geography (whether the borrower is 
from the same state as the lender – California) has an impact on the probability of a bid 
being placed. The focus on this “Same-State” dichotomous variable is highly consistent 
with the literature (Graham et al., 2009; Hortacsu et al., 2009).  
More specifically, my level of analysis is a borrower-lender dyad, and the main 
outcome of interest is the probability that a transaction occurs between that dyad (a bid 
being placed):  
 
    (                        )   (                                     )      
 
If a lender places a bid in the borrower's auction (loan request), then the outcome 
variable takes on the value of 1. Otherwise it takes on 0. I gather all available information 
about the borrowers and lenders, and use them as explanatory variables. The key variable 
is whether the borrower is a resident of California. If this variable is equal to 1, then the 
borrower is from the same state as the lender. 
The main explanatory variable of interest is whether the borrower and lender are 
from the same state. In the main empirical model, I include this as a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of 1when borrowers and lenders are from the same state. This is one of 
the variables in the vector of “BorrowerInfo” in the equation above. Other explanatory 
variables associated with borrower characteristics and auction characteristics are 
similarly defined in Lin et al (2009). I also include variables of whether the borrower has 
friends, whether the lender has friends, and whether or not they are affiliated with groups. 
I pursue these further in the robustness tests.  
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I further derive two continuous measures for distance. The first one is the spatial 
distance between California and the other states, defined as the driving distance between 
capitals of each state. The driving distances are calculated based on Google Map data, 
where I use an automated agent to submit the name of the cities to Google Maps, and 
then parse the resulting webpage. This should be a more relevant measure than the “great 
circle distance” because I am studying individual behavior within a national boundary. 
Exceptions are Alaska and Hawaii, for which I use great circle distance, because no 
driving routes are available. I take logarithm on this variable before using it in the 
regression models.  
The second measure of distance is Economic Distance (Tsang & Yip, 2007) 
between borrowers and lenders. The economic distance between the borrower's and the 
lenders' states were measured as the difference in the logarithm of the GDP per capita of 
their states in 2009:  
              (             )                        
 
where GDP information about each state was obtained from the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. This value is equal to 0 for California borrowers, less than 0 for borrowers from 
states that are economically more advanced than California, and greater than 0 for 




5.1. Main Findings 
 
I report my main results from the analysis in Table 2.3. The first column shows 
the model estimated on the overall sample. There is a statistically significant “home bias” 
in the overall sample – an exhaustive list of potential dyads – using only a parsimonious 
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logistic model. Standard errors are also conservatively estimated using clustered 
sandwich estimators to allow for intra-state correlation (since there are multiple 
borrowers from the same state). I do not have to resort to special statistical assumptions 
such as those in Rare-event logit, or special data reduction techniques. In terms of 
economic significance, being a Californian borrower increases the odds ratio (probability 
of being funded vs. not funded) by 13%. Unfortunately I am unable to find an effect size 
in the literature to directly compare with, as most studies either use aggregate trading 
volume (Hortacsu et al., 2009) or using continuous measures of distance (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001).  
Many studies have shown that there are both rational and emotional components 
to home bias; hence, I next investigate how these two dimensions interact with each 
other. Since it is not possible to measure the “emotional” factors on each potential dyad, I 
conduct a stratified analysis instead.  
Out of the many factors that capture the “rational” part of decision making, the 
credit grade of the borrower (letter grades reflecting the range of borrower's FICO scores) 
is by far the most important one. Hence I stratify borrowers by their credit grade. More 
specifically, I split the borrowers into two groups according to their credit grades: those 
with credit grades of AA or A (FICO scores of 720 and up), and those with B, C, or D 
(600-719)
6
. I then estimate the same model on these subsamples (removing dummy 
variables for credit grades), and report the results in the second and third columns of 
Table 2.3. Results show that good borrowers from the same state as the lenders are more 
likely to receive bids than non-residents. Quite surprisingly, less creditworthy borrowers 
                                                 
6
 In a robustness test, I remove borrowers of credit grade B, and compare AA/A versus C/D and obtained 
very consistent results. These stratification analyses are consistent with the empirical literature when there 
are multiple categories. An example is Hsu (2004).  
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are actually penalized. There seems to be an interesting interaction effect between 
“reason” and emotions of investor decisions. In addition, these effects are both significant 
on the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, results suggest that, if the borrower is 
a good candidate in terms of hard credit information, the chances of them obtaining a bid 
is almost 70% more than not receiving a bid. On the other hand, if the borrower is not as 
creditworthy, the probability of receiving a bid is less than half of the probability that 
they will not receive a bid.  
The above results from the stratified analysis suggest that not only is there a home 
bias in the online investors’ decisions, such a bias is especially prominent when a 
decision to lend can be supported by rational criteria. Otherwise, when there is lack of 
rational appeal, home bias in fact works against a potential trading partner who is from 
the same geographical area: there may be a bias, but not in the sense of a preferential 
treatment.   
 
5.2. Geographic Distance vs. Economic Distance: Dyad-Level Analysis 
 
A natural extension from the analyses above is to look at borrowers' distance from 
California lenders, and how that may affect investors' decisions. The literature proposes 
two ways of measuring the distance: Geographical, or Economic. As mentioned 
previously, I measure the geographic distance between the borrower and California 
lenders as the driving distance between California state capital (Sacremento) to the 
capital of the borrowers' state of residence (in miles). I test the effect of this variable in a 
number of ways: (1) the actual distance; (2) logarithm of this distance; (3) the inverse of 
the square of the distance (consistent with the gravity equation in astronomy). Results 
reported in the Tables use the logarithm of distance, but are qualitatively similar with 
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other measurements. I then measure the economic distance between the borrower and the 
lender using the difference in the logarithm of their respective state's per capita GDP in 
2009. A greater economic distance reflects larger differences of economic development 
between borrower state and lender state.  
These results are reported in the last column of Table 2.3. When I incorporate 
both the economic and spatial distance metrics in the model of bidding probabilities, the 
impact of economic distance unequivocally dominates that of geographical distance: 
While an increase in distance from CA always decreases the probability of receiving a 
bid, the effect of economic distance is much more salient than that of the geographic 
distance. This striking difference can be seen both in terms of the level of statistical 
significance and economic difference – an increase in the economic distance reduces the 
chance of receiving a bid much faster than an increase in spatial distance.  
 
5.3. Geographic Distance vs. Economic Distance: State-Level Analysis 
 
The effect of the economic distance is also obvious on a state-level analysis, 
where I aggregate all loan requests from each state. Figure 1 shows an interesting pattern: 
as the economic distance increases in either direction (away from zero), the volume of 
transactions decreases. On the other hand, when I measure by geographical driving 
distance, the difference is mostly dichotomous: all non-California states seem to cluster 
together, instead of displaying any gradual spatial patterns (see Figure 2).  These figures 
not only show a macro-level concentration of lending activities toward California (home-
state) borrowers, but also lend support to the notion that economic distance can provide 
more interesting insights than geographic distance alone. In particular, the result on the 
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spatial distance differs strikingly from the smoothly-decreasing pattern depicted in Figure 
1 of Sorenson and Stuart (2001). 
 
 
Figure 1: Investment Amount vs. Econ distance from CA 
   
Figure 2: Investment Amount vs. Geographic Distance from CA 
 
 
What are the implications of the comparison between geographical distance and 
economic distance? The relatively low effect of geographic distance suggests that other 
than home bias, the effect of spatial distance is in fact quite small. This is possible due to 
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interactions between borrowers and lenders, and lenders cannot monitor these loans after 
they are originated, and therefore, for California lenders, whether a borrower is in Seattle 
or New York does not make a difference in terms of how long it takes to get there.  
On the other hand, the results on the economic distance tell a different story. It is 
highly likely that, similar to home bias, economic distance points to the emotional side of 
investor decisions. It is not because borrowers from less developed states are more likely 
to default: The above results are robust even when I control for state-level default 
information of Prosper.com loans in the past (see the robustness tests below). It is more 
likely that economic distance reflects prejudices or stereotypes against certain states, not 
financial creditworthiness.  
 
6. Robustness and Additional Tests 
 
I now turn to a number of robustness tests and address some possible alternative 
explanations.  
6.1. Friends, Friend-of-a-Friend, Groups, and other Social Ties: Is it “Home Bias”, 
or is it Private Information?  
 
Is it possible that the “home bias” I observe is in fact only due to friendship ties? 
If all lenders are merely investing in their friends, and all friends are in the same state, 
then I will still have the results shown in Table 2.3. In that case, it is really not about 
“home bias”, but rather the fact that investors simply have more information about their 
friends and act (bid) accordingly. Bids could be simply a reflection of such private 
information. Indeed, the overall Prosper.com social networks data shows that friends tend 
to come from the same geographic region.  
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To test the validity of this alternative explanation, I use the friendship network on 
Prosper.com at the start and the end of the California window, and then submit all 
potential dyads to these graphs to identify possible connections. Out of over 300,000 
possible transaction dyads in this time period, only 3 borrower-lender pairs occur. In 
other words, only on three 3 occasions during the “mini Prosper” do I see friends bid on a 
borrower. While friendship may have played a role for other borrowers (cf. Lin et al 
2009), those borrowers may not be active in this time window.   
There were also no “friend-of-a-friend” (FOAF) relationships between any 
potential dyads in this time period. None of the potential borrower-lender dyads in this 
time period shares a common friend. Moreover, I do not observe friends on the third 
(friend of a friend of a friend), fourth, up to the 7
th
 degree (i.e. separated by 6 degrees) in 
the data. Therefore, potential transitivity of network ties does not explain the home bias 
in my sample either.  
Another social relationship that could convey private information is group 
membership. Members can join groups and could have some private interactions. 
However, most groups on Prosper.com do not have much private communications; in 
many cases the communication is from the group leader to the members; much less 
occurs among members
7
. Furthermore, if an investor and a borrower both support certain 
groups
8
, that may also have an effect on the investor as that shows a common ideology. 
However, much like the friendship ties, shared memberships of groups (being a member 
                                                 
7
 Many groups are inactive after Prosper.com discontinues the incentives for the leaders. A few groups are 
indeed active and members have a lot of interactions outside Prosper.com, such as on third-party discussion 
forums. However, most of these groups are lender groups, and may not be California lenders. Cases where 
lender belong to a group and lend to a borrower in CA are virtually nonexistent.  
8
 A member can join one group at a time. They can, however, “support” multiple groups. This is a very 
cheap signal, however, as there are no opportunity costs for supporting any group.  
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or simply showing support for a group) are negligible between the potential borrowers 
and lenders in my small time window. Those with strong ties usually have created loans 
before Prosper.com was shut down; it is highly unlikely for them to predict the “Mini 
Prosper” window, let alone set up loan requests during this period. There is no benefit to 
do so whatsoever.  
I can therefore rule out the possibility that the “home bias” in the results reported 
earlier is a reflection of private information. It is, in fact, an investor’s preferential 
treatment toward a borrower who is a stranger to the investor – except that they came 
from the same state. This shared geographical tie is more likely emotional rather than 
rational.  
6.2. Loan defaults on the state level 
 
Is it possible that investors’ preference toward California borrowers is simply a 
reflection of past repayment history of California borrowers? If California borrowers 
have been systematically less likely to default than other states, then home bias may still 
be attributed to rational decision making. This, however, does not turn out to be the case.  
I test this alternative explanation by aggregating the loan information up until the 
start of the “mini Prosper” period. For each state, I calculate the number of loans that 
were defaulted, percentage of loans in default, and the amount lost in investment (default 
amount). I then add these variables as additional covariates to my main model. They do 
not, however, change the results on the dummy variable of “same-state”, or the results on 
economic versus spatial distances.   
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6.3. How much to lend, when to lend 
 
If I consider the lenders’ decisions in light of the choice model literature in 
marketing, a natural extension of the above analysis will be the following. Conditional on 
choosing a Californian borrower, how much does the investor lend? Furthermore, given 
the open-bidding nature of the process, when did the investor actually place the bid? Did 
they bid early, or did they wait until others have bid?  
To answer these questions I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model, 
where the first stage outcome is whether a bid was placed. For the second stage, I 
consider several different outcome variables: (1) Amount of bid; (2) Winning amount of 
bid; and (3) The order of bids. I use the same set of explanatory variables as before 
(auction characteristics, lender characteristics and bidder characteristics) for consistency. 
I find that while the sign of the dummy variable for California borrowers are largely in a 
direction consistent with the “home bias” argument (larger bid amount, larger 
participation amount, as well as earlier bids), in most cases these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. This may be the result of a small sample: only 461 bids go to 
California borrowers.  The second stage analysis is based on these actual bids on 
California borrowers, a very small sample.  
 
7. Discussions, Limitations and Implications 
 
Before I discuss potential limitations of the current study, I will first summarize 
the main findings from analyzing the natural experiment of “Mini-Prosper”:  
(1) Home-state bias is indeed robust, despite the fact that I only use conservative 
data and models are used.  
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(2) Home-bias shows an interaction effect with rational criteria of lender 
decisions. The benefit of home bias accrues mostly to borrowers with good 
credit grades. Those less creditworthy are in fact biased against.  
(3) Economic distances among states have higher impacts than spatial distances 
on investor decisions. These effects cannot be rationalized by prior 
Prosper.com loan performance data from each state.  
 
One possible objection to this study is that I only have data on California lenders 
who may or may not be representative of other lenders on Prosper.com. However, the 
main goal of my paper to leverage an interesting natural experiment to convincingly 
identify that such biases still exist under conservative data, conservative estimation 
procedures, and a much lower probability of endogeneity in geographical variables.  
Given a suitable natural experiment on other states, a replication of these findings will 
certainly be desirable.  
A possible extension of this study is to examine the borrowing-lending 
relationship in the overall market. This, however, is subject to many constraints. First, if I 
consider the entire population of borrowers and lenders, the sample of all possible dyads 
are very likely unmanageable. This, in turn, will call for data reduction techniques that 
can potentially weaken the plausibility of home bias. Second, a unique feature of my 
analysis is that only CA lenders are participating. While this may sound restrictive, it is in 
fact an ideal feature to avoid the confounding factor of lender interactions in the auction 
process. For instance, the bids placed by earlier bidders may affect another lender. This is 
not an issue in my analyses, as all lenders are from the same state.  
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One other objection is that “state” is still a rather broad geographical concept. 
There could be significant difference in Northern California versus Southern California. 
Hence, a natural follow-up study is to replicate the analysis on the city level. Although I 
have information about the city of the borrower, that information about lenders has not 
been made available. It will certainly be interesting to see what happens within California 
itself.  
It is also worth pursuing whether “home bias” is rational ex-post, as measured by 
the actual outcome of the loans that are generated. Unfortunately, many borrowing 
requests made during this window never reached the end of the duration, and therefore 
never became loans. Even though some of them reach 100% funding, the borrower may 
have chosen the “open” format for their auctions, and the auctions may still be ongoing 
when the site shut down. Only 13 loans were actually generated in this time period, hence 
there is no data to analyze the ex post rationality of “home bias”.  
Nevertheless, the present analysis of “Mini Prosper” has a number of important 
theoretical and practical implications.  
First of all, this essay of my dissertation represents the first empirical study of 
home bias in the online peer-to-peer lending marketplace. While there is a growing 
literature using data from online peer-to-peer lending websites, especially Prosper.com, 
to my knowledge this is the first empirical study of investors’ home bias in this 
marketplace.  
Second, my data and analyses also represent important contributions to empirical 
studies of home bias in economic transactions. The natural experiment on Prosper.com 
creates a short time window where there are a manageable number of borrowers and 
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lenders, and lenders are also artificially constrained to one state only. I have information 
on each individual level, which allows me to conduct the analysis on the level of all 
possible transaction dyads. Constraining the lenders to one state eliminates confounding 
effects from lenders in other states. Most important, the unexpected beginning and end of 
this window eliminates the possibility of individuals strategically choosing a location, 
which could have led to endogeneity in the geography variables. I am also able to rule out 
alternative explanations such as private information embedded in social networks or 
state-level default history.  
More broadly, my study shows that emotions, especially those induced by shared 
geographical ties and shorter economic distance, do have an impact on individual 
decision making. Furthermore, there is an interesting interplay between emotional and 
rational drivers of decisions. Geography affects how individual investors utilize and 
process hard credit information. In other words, emotional factors interact and strengthen 
the effects of hard credit information on investor choices.  
Last but not least, my study also contributes unique evidence to the literature on 
market access (Redding & Sturm, 2008), and therefore has significant policy 
implications. Even though e-commerce has been hailed as “borderless” or “frictionless” 
(Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000), results from this study suggest that geography still matters 
for online transactions. Market access does matter for online commerce, a point that 
could have significant regulatory implications. Investors are more likely to place bids on 
same-state creditworthy borrowers, and this is likely to increase the chances of those 
loans to be funded, and also decrease their interest rates. While my study does not 
directly address the issue of social welfare, it does point to the fact that well-qualified 
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borrowers, at least, suffers when there is an absence of home-state lenders. Artificially 
constraining one side of the market can hurt the other side of the market as well, 
potentially decreasingly the overall social welfare. Policymakers, especially those at the 
state level, should carefully consider these implications as they evaluate the request from 
peer-to-peer lending websites. As of the time of writing, regulators are largely willing to 
allow borrowers to use peer-to-peer lending websites, but much less so when they 
consider lender participations.  █ 
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ESSAY 3: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ONLINE OUTSOURCING: 
SIGNALS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTRACT REGIMES 
 
Abstract 
Technology enables new ways of monitoring worker efforts, new ways of contracting, 
and consequently new ways of sharing risks in outsourcing arrangements. In this essay, I 
study whether and how new contractual arrangements (pay-for-deliverable to pay-for-
time contracts) impact the efficacy of signals that proved to be such as online reputation, 
certification, and language characteristics, on the chances of virtual sellers winning 
outsourcing contracts. Using a comprehensive dataset from an online outsourcing 
marketplace, I model how buyers choose among bidding sellers, and how the efficacy of 
these signals change under different contract forms.   My results show that online 
reputation is an important predictor of success only for pay-for-deliverable contracts, but 
not significant for pay-for-time contracts. In other words, contract forms can potentially 
mitigate the typical Matthew Effect (“the rich get richer”) of online reputation systems. 
Contrary to popular belief, certification does not increase the chances of winning 
regardless of the contract forms. This study is one of the first to study the interaction 
between contract formats and different signals that vendors can reveal to buyers in the 
competitive bidding process. More broadly, as technology provides outsourcing buyers 
with greater control and easier monitoring of vendors, it enables them to substitute 
second-party historical information (for e.g., “online reputation”) with first-hand 




Recent developments in Internet technologies have transformed many industries, and the 
market for labor is a vivid example (Autor, 2001). While previously only large businesses 
could outsource or offshore software development activities, online markets now allow 
small buyers and sellers to engage in transactions and even build long-term relationships. 
The lower barriers to enter the market allow projects of much smaller sizes to be 
effectively outsourced online. Meanwhile, despite the rapid growth of these markets that 
bring together atomistic buyers and sellers, the “virtual” and “small stake” nature of these 
markets exacerbates issues of information asymmetry and the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviors.  My goal in this essay of the dissertation is to better understand the process 
through which buyers and sellers
9
 are matched in this marketplace. In particular, as new 
technologies emerge to allow buyers more effectively monitor the efforts of sellers, new 
contract forms emerge. I study whether and how new micro-contracting mechanisms
10
 
change the value of various signals in affecting buyers' choices.  
The issue of asymmetric information in traditional outsourcing leads to an 
extensive literature on contract forms. Some of the popular forms of contracts in 
outsourcing include fixed-price contracts, time-and-materials contracts, and pay-for-
performance contracts (Dey, Fan and Zhang 2010). Different contract forms stipulate 
different schemes of risk sharing. For instance, under fixed-price contracts, if software 
                                                 
9
 In this essay, “buyers,” “employers” and “clients” refer to individuals and companies who have software 
needs. “Sellers,” “vendors” and “developers” refer to programmers who work for the buyers. For 
consistency, I will mostly use “buyers” versus “sellers.”  
10
 As Section 3 will discuss in greater detail (page 6), I study two contract forms in this essay. Pay-for-
deliverable (PFD) contracts are similar to the “fixed-price” contracts in outsourcing literature. Pay-for-time 
(PFT) contracts are comparable to “time-and-materials” contracts in the literature, but with one important 
difference: PFT contracts in my data allow buyers to very effectively monitor the effort level of sellers, 
which was not possible in traditional outsourcing.  
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developer (seller) underestimates the effort required for a project, the seller will bear the 
additional costs. Under time-and-materials contracts, when project scopes increase, 
buyers will have to absorb additional costs. Pay-for-performance contracts allow sellers 
earnings to be contingent upon the profits that buyers can derive from the software. 
Different allocations of risks lead to different incentives of buyers and sellers, thereby 
affecting their behaviors as well.  
Fixed-price contracts have long found a counterpart in online outsourcing markets, 
typically referred to as “pay-for-deliverable” (PFD) contracts. As online outsourcing 
markets develop, new ways of monitoring seller efforts are emerging in recent years, 
which further give rise to new ways of contracting. One of the most exciting 
developments is the emergence of “pay-for-time” (PFT) contracts. PFT contracts are 
similar to time-and-materials contracts in the outsourcing literature, but with one 
important difference: online outsourcing markets allow buyers to effectively monitor the 
effort level of sellers under PFT contracts, which is not available in the traditional time-
and-materials contracts. As I will describe in greater detail later, monitoring technologies 
can include keystroke logging and webcam image capturing.  
Such technology-enabled monitoring provides a greater degree of control and 
information transparency to buyers in the outsourcing process. Buyers now have a much 
lower exposure to seller opportunism than under a traditional time-and-materials contract. 
I hypothesize that these advances in monitoring and contract formats will induce a 
change in the value of signals such as online reputation of sellers, which represent 
historical information about sellers from other buyers. Another signal that has been 
shown to be a significant predictor of success in outsourcing is certification, and I also 
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test for its effectiveness in this context. As an exploration, I further investigate whether 
and how the initial communications from sellers to a potential buyer affect sellers’ 
chances of winning the outsourcing contract.  
This study builds on the vast literature in outsourcing from economics, 
information systems, and other disciplines. While the choice of contract forms is a 
popular topic in the extant literature, much less is known about how buyers and sellers 
came into contact in the first place – the process through which the buyer is matched with 
a seller. One possible reason is that such data is typically very hard to obtain. My study 
attempts to fulfill this gap in the literature by using a comprehensive dataset from a large 
online outsourcing marketplace, where all transactions are archived and made available. I 
focus on two signals in the seller’s bidding process that the literature in outsourcing has 
shown to be effective: (1) the reputation of the seller, reflecting his or her prior 
experience with other trading partners; and (2) third-party certification. While the 
literature has documented the impact of both signals, most studies use information about 
buyers and sellers who actually engaged in transactions, and very little is known about 
those who failed to obtain the contract in the first place. There has been no study on how 
their effects change under different contract mechanisms. Moreover, while PFT contracts 
bear some similarity to time-and-material contracts, the underlying monitoring 
technology is entirely new. My study is the first to examine the effect of such new 
technology on the value of signals in the buyers’ choice process. 
To summarize, the main research questions that I address in the paper are:  
(1) What variables affect a buyer's choice among potential sellers; and  
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(2) How do the efficacy of the following traditional signals of quality change under 
different contracting mechanisms?  
(a) Reputation mechanism reflecting a vendors' past performance with other 
buyers;  
(b) Third-party certification that can potentially serve as a signal. 
These variables are identified from a review of the literature on reputation 
systems, contracts, and outsourcing. My working hypothesis is that, not only should these 
factors play a role in the buyer's decision process, but their effects should differ under 
different contractual arrangements because of the difference in risk sharing. The most 
important hypothesis is that as technology allows buyers to more effectively monitor the 
effort level of sellers, they should be able to substitute “old” information from others 
(ratings) with their first-hand experiential information with a particular worker. The value 
of traditional information will be significantly discounted.  
2. Literature Review 
This study is positioned at the intersection of reputation systems, certification, and 
contract formats, especially in the context of outsourcing. While there is a vast stream of 
research on these topics, I focus on research that directly relates to the current study
11
. 
Outsourcing has attracted significant interest in many disciplines, including 
economics and information systems (Koh, Soon, & Straub, 2004; Levina & Ross, 2003; 
Tanriverdi, Konana, & Ling, 2007). Two most popular forms of contracting are Fixed 
Price (FP) Contracts and Time-and-Materials (T&M) Contracts. Fixed Price contracts 
                                                 
11
 To avoid confusion, I will use pay-for-time (PFT) and pay-for-deliverable (PFD) to refer to the contract 
forms in the online outsourcing markets. Fixed-price (FP) and time-and-materials (T&M) contracts should 
refer to the contract forms used in traditional outsourcing literature. While FP is similar to PFD, T&M and 
PFT are different as PFT allows effective monitoring through the online platform.  
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specify a fixed price for an outsourcing project, and the vendor will be paid the agreed 
amount upon satisfactory delivery of projects. The risk is on the vendors: if they 
underestimate the cost of development, they cannot charge a higher price later. Time-and-
Materials contract, on the other hand, is more flexible and shifts the risk to the buyer. 
Sellers are paid by time and the cost incurred, instead of the pre-specified amount. 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have examined the distinction between 
Fixed Price and Time-and-Materials contracts. Gopal, Sivaramakrishnan et al. (2003) 
investigated the determinants of contract choice, and further related the choice to project 
outcomes using data from vendors located in India. Hasija, Pinker and Shumsky (2008) 
employed data from an outsourcing vendor to investigate the effect of different 
combinations of contract features. Through content analyses of actual contracts, Chen 
and Bharadwaj (2009) found that contract format has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between contract provisions and transactional characteristics. The stylized 
models of Dey, Fan and Zhang (2010) suggested that Fixed-Price contracts are better for 
simple outsourcing projects, while Time-and-Materials contracts are better suited for 
complex ones. These results are echoed in Bajari and Tadelis (2001).   
The control and enforcement issues in outsourcing have also attracted researchers’ 
attention. For instance, Kirsch (1997) proposed that a portfolio of control modes could be 
adapted to outsourcing. Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) studied variables that lead to the 
use of formal controls. Meanwhile, one of the classical issues in outsourcing is the hold-
up problem, where the party that makes buyer-specific investments will be at a 
disadvantage during negotiations. Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade (2010) studied IT 
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outsourcing service contracts and found that contract extensiveness could mitigate the 
hold-up problem, but this is moderated by the complexity of tasks.  
Reputation is another important subject widely studied in outsourcing. Vendor 
(seller) reputation has been linked to contractual performance (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; 
Lewis, 1986), since the concern for reputation can potentially “outweigh the temptation 
to renege on a given contract” (Tykvová, 2007). Jensen and Roy (2008) modeled the 
choice a trading partner as a two-stage process, in which reputation helps to decide 
among a bracket of alternatives.  
While the issue of reputation systems in electronic commerce have been 
extensively studied in the context of product exchanges (such as those on eBay), there 
has been relatively little empirical study of reputation in the offline outsourcing context. 
One possible reason is that firms rarely share their outsourcing experience with others, 
and there is also no central platform for them to do so even if they wish to. By contrast, 
online outsourcing markets often extensively use such reputation systems to document 
sellers’ performances. They thus provide an ideal context to study the use of reputation 
systems in the choice process of buyers in outsourcing.  
A typical issue in traditional Time-and-Materials contracts is that the effort level 
of sellers cannot be easily monitored or verified. This has been significantly changed in 
the online outsourcing marketplace because of new technologies that allow buyers to 
effectively monitor the effort level of sellers. As buyers need to approve the billing hours 
submitted by sellers, they can accurately evaluate sellers’ efforts if necessary. This makes 
it possible for them to cautiously take some risks and conduct business with sellers who 
have lesser experience on the marketplace, but are able to complete the task at lower 
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costs. If they do turn out to be of low quality, the buyers will be able to terminate the 
contract, instead of having to wait until the deadline under a pay-for-deliverables contract, 
thereby reducing the loss. Therefore, in the online outsourcing market, I should expect to 
see the value of online reputations of a seller (ratings) as a signal change from being a 
significant predictor of winning a contract under PFD schemes, to being insignificant 
under PFT schemes. This is a major hypothesis that I will test in the data.  
Hypothesis 1: A seller’s online rating (volume and valence) should be a 
significant predictor for winning an outsourcing contract under pay-for-deliverable 
(PFD) schemes, but insignificant under pay-for-time (PFT) contracts.  
Another topic that has received significant attention is the role of certifications, 
especially those from third-parties. One such study in the context of outsourcing is Gopal 
and Gao (2009), who studied the effect of ISO certification on outsourcing vendors. 
Similar to ISO certifications, the online outsourcing marketplace where I gathered the 
data provides links to a third-party certification website that tests the sellers’ skills on 
different subjects. When sellers pass these exams, an icon will be displayed next to their 
ID and prominently displayed to buyers when the seller places a bid. Along the same vein 
as Hypothesis 1, I propose that the effect of certification on winning a contract should be 
significant under pay-for-deliverable contracts, but not so under pay-for-time contracts. .  
Hypothesis 2: A seller should have higher chances of winning an outsourcing 
contract when he or she has been certified under pay-for-deliverable (PFD) contracts, 
but insignificant under pay-for-time (PFT) contracts.  









Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
3. Context 
In this section, I describe major features of the online labor outsourcing 
marketplace that provided the data for my analyses, the introduction of a new contracting 
mechanism, the construction of matched samples for analyses, and the derivation of 
various variables used in my statistical models.  
I obtained data for this study from one of the leading online software outsourcing 
marketplaces. This marketplace is headquartered in the United States, but buyers and 
sellers of the market come from all over the world. The largest proportion of work done 
on this site is customized software development, although more recently there has also 
been a growing need for graphic design and other tasks. Software development programs 
include designing a website, enhancing e-commerce website features, file format 
conversions, and so on. Some examples of typical requests posted on the website are
12
:  
“We need to integrate our website with Google Checkout … If client 
selects "credit card" as the payment method, he arrives to a custom 
payment page where he can enter credit card information. This card 
information is sent to bank processor, if approved, then a receipt page is 
displayed and order data is updated. If ……”  
  
                                                 
12
 Due to non-disclosure agreements, these descriptions have been slightly changed to protect the privacy 







“Small site design needs to be re-coded/optimized for newer standards. 
Requirements: 1.Convert to XHTML 1.0 strict; 2.Convert all of site design 
to use CSS; 3. MUST be W3C validated...” 
 
“I need a PHP script that will read every SQLite database in a directory. 
These databases all have the same schema. Insert their entries into a 
MySQL table with a similar schema, plus a column for file names.” 
 
3.1 Overview  
This proprietary dataset contains extensive information about software buyers, sellers, 
their transactions, communications, mutual ratings and other information from October 
2001 to October 2010 (as I will discuss shortly, my analyses will not use the full sample). 
This is a marketplace of over 250,000 software developers (sellers) and more than 
120,000 software buyers from around the world. These are typically small software 
development projects, mostly ranging between $150 and $300. Prior to September 2009, 
all projects are “fixed-price contracts”: Sellers are paid when they deliver satisfactory 
products according to buyer requirements. If the sellers underestimate the time and cost 
involved, they will have to bear the extra cost.  
3.2  A Typical Process of Transaction 
This section describes the typical process of transaction on this market as of the 
time of writing.   
Buyers and sellers first sign up with an email address. Before they enter any 
contracts, the website will verify their identity. For instance, US buyers are verified by 
phone, credit card, and driver’s license information. Once the verification is complete, 
buyers post “request-for-bids” on the site. A typical request includes a title, a summary of 
requirements, and a rough budget (e.g., maximum $500). It should be noted that it is 
buyers who determine the form of the contract (pay-for-time or pay-for-deliverables).  
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Software developers (sellers) can browse the requests, search for keywords, and 
they can be notified of new projects should they choose to receive such alert emails from 
the site. When they find a project of interest, they can post a bid, which is the amount 
they will charge for the delivered product. Along with the bid, they can (optionally) 
submit a text message trying to convince the buyer that they are a good candidate. This is 
very similar to the “pitch” that entrepreneurs make to venture capitalists when they seek 
funding. It should be noted that these are sealed bid auctions, in the sense that only the 
buyer can see the bids placed; peer sellers cannot observe each other’s bids.  
Buyers can communicate with the sellers, and then choose a seller to work with 
by accepting his or her bid. Buyers can choose any bid he or she wants, and lower price 
bids do not necessarily win. This is an important feature of the online labor market that 
distinguishes itself from websites such as eBay.  
Once the bid is accepted, the buyer will first pay the amount of the bid by credit 
card or electronic check into an escrow account of the site. Then, the site sends a 
notification to the seller that they can start working on the project. A contract is thus 
created.  
The buyer and seller communicate with each other through the website to clarify 
requirements and other details. When the seller finishes the project, he or she uploads 
programs to the site, and the buyer can download it to test whether the requirements are 
met. If so, buyers accept the project as 100% complete, and the funds are released from 
the escrow account to the seller. Buyers and sellers can then rate each other on a scale of 
1 to 10, and also provide comments on each other. These ratings become public 
information on their profiles, and form the “reputation” system on the marketplace. 
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The website deducts a percentage of fees from the escrowed amount when it is 
released to the vendor. These fees are not only for the provision of an infrastructure and 
possible arbitrations (see next paragraph), but also for taking care of paperwork related to 
taxes and other issues involved in paying another person, especially those in a foreign 
country.  
If the project is not completed due to any reason, it typically enters arbitration. 
The arbitrator is a staff member of the site and the arbitration process can be initiated by 
either the buyer or the seller. The arbitrator will review all communications on site, 
including the original requirements, and will contact both parties. Offline 
communications, if any, are not considered in the process. If either party fails to respond, 
he or she receives a low rating, and loses.  
3.3 Emergence of Pay-for-Time Contracts 
Up until September of 2009, all projects in this online marketplace use the “pay-
by-deliverables” (PFD) format; that is, the buyer and seller agree on the requirements of 
the project at the beginning, and the cost of the project is fixed. This is comparable to the 
“fixed price” contracts in outsourcing, where the buyer’s obligation is limited a priori and 
the burden of risks falls on the vendors. In September 2009, the website started to allow 
buyers and sellers to enter “pay-for-time” contracts. Under PFT arrangements, sellers are 
merely paid by the number of hours they work on the project without guaranteeing the 
outcome, and the buyer can terminate the contract at any time. If mutually agreed, the 
contract can extend at the agreed hourly rate. This is made possible only because the 
website created an application to allow the buyers to closely monitor the efforts of the 
sellers. When the sellers start working on a pay-for-time project, they will log into the 
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monitoring software, which will take random screenshots, keystrokes as well as webcam 
pictures at certain intervals. The buyers can also manually take additional pictures or 
keystroke recordings as required by the contract. These records are kept for the purpose 
of arbitration; if the buyer believes that the seller has inflated the number of hours, the 
arbitrator can use these recordings as evidence.  
This change in technology provides an interesting context for me to study how 
different contract formats change the effect of various seller signals (reputation and 
certification) on winning a contract. 
3.4 Reputation Systems 
Much like eBay, the website has developed extensive reputation systems for the 
sellers so as to assist buyer's choice among candidates. When buyers and sellers first sign 
up, they have no ratings. When a project is completely successfully, buyers and sellers 
can rate each other. The rating has a numeric part that ranges from 1 to 10 stars, as well 
as a textual part that they can comment on the rating. Information about number of 
ratings that the seller has received up to the time of the bids, as well as the average of 
those ratings, are displayed prominently to future buyers when they look at the list of 
sellers who placed bids.  Just as in eBay and other e-commerce markets, online reputation 
systems is a reflection of a seller’s past performance with another individual. My working 
hypothesis is that such information can be rendered less relevant in buyers’ decision 
process when they have access to the efficient monitoring technologies.  
3.5 Certifications 
The website also works with a third party provider who allows sellers to take 
exams online on different subjects. As of the time of writing, these exams are free of 
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charge. If they fail an exam, they can wait a few days before making another attempt. 
After they pass an exam, the website will display an “Expert” icon next to their bids 
when the category of their exam matches the category of the project, such as the 
programming language required by the buyer.  
4. Sample Construction 
To understand the factors affecting buyers' choices of vendors and rule out 
alternative explanations, I constructed two samples of auctions that consummated in 
actual contracts (i.e., buyers matched to a seller). I then extracted all bids placed in those 
auctions, information about buyers and sellers as of the time of the contract, as well as 
project descriptions and communications. The next paragraph describes additional details 
about how these two samples are constructed. I will test whether effects of various 
variables on a bidder’s success change under different contract regimes using these 
samples, both jointly and separately.  
Sample #1: Pay-for-time (PFT) contracts 
Although PFT is a promising new mechanism, it has not yet gained traction in this 
online marketplace. One year after PFT contracts are allowed, there were still less than 
200 such contracts that were actually created between buyers and sellers. To allow for 
meaningful statistical analysis, I try to retain as many PFT contracts as reasonably 
possible.  
I first removed PFT requests that did not result in an actual contract. While I have 
data on bid requests (auctions) that do not have any winning bids at all, I exclude them 
because a contract failing to consummate may be due to unrealistic requirements of the 
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buyers, instead of any characteristics of the vendors. Focusing on contracts that were 
actually created eliminates confounding factors from the buyer's side.  
Less than 1% of the PFT contracts are between buyer-seller pairs who had prior 
relationships. I removed these observations as buyers are faced with much lower levels of 
uncertainty in those cases; this is also to ensure consistency with sample #2.  
Sample #2: Pay-for-deliverable (PFD) contracts  
Pay-for-deliverable contract is the original format used on the website, and it is 
also what most users are accustomed with. Hence, even after pay-for-time contracts are 
made available; many users (buyers and vendors) continue to use pay-for-deliverable 
contracts. This is especially true among buyer-vendor pairs that already have repeated 
transactions. Almost all pay-for-time contracts (one year after the implementation of the 
new method) are between buyer-seller dyads that do not have prior transactions. Hence, 
for Sample #2 (PFT contracts), I also removed the contracts between parties with prior 
experience. This ensures that buyers in these two samples face comparable degrees of 
uncertainty when they choose among the vendors.  
I then retained only PFD contracts in the three months prior to the introduction of 
PFT contracts (June - August 2009). This was to ensure that vendors did not face 
resource constraints and had to choose between PFD and PFT auctions posted at the same 
period of time.  
Subsequently, I took a random sample of PFD between June and August 2009 so 
that there was approximately the same number of contracts in Sample #2 as in Sample #1.  
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Once both samples were constructed, I extracted all bids related to those auctions, 
including information about certifications, ratings and so on at the time that the seller 
placed the bid.  
4.1 Level of Analysis and Dependent Variable 
The level of analysis in my model is each bid; I study how characteristics of 
sellers’ (reputations; certifications) and their comments are associated with the outcome 
of their bids. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 
when a bid wins the buyer’s contract; 0 otherwise.  
4.2 Independent variables:  
(1) ExpertCertification: Indicates whether or not there is an “Expert Certification” icon 
next to the sellers’ bids. Unlike certifications in traditional outsourcing contexts which 
are much more difficult to obtain, certification on this market is free of charge, and 
sellers are allowed to re-take exams. In other words, this is a relatively cheap signal. 
Whether or not this is a useful signal is an empirical question.  
 (2) noRating: An indicator variable that the seller has not yet received any ratings.  
 (3) AvgRating: The mean of ratings that the seller has received up to the time that the bid 
was placed.  
 (4) logRatingsCount: Logarithm of the number of ratings that the seller has received up 
to the time of the bid.  
 (5) BuyerSellerSameCountry: An indicator variable that the buyer and seller are residents 
of the same country. The literature typically suggests that buyers and sellers in the same 
country are more likely to interact with each other (Hillberry & Hummels, 2003), either 
due to homophily (Reagans, 2005) or lower transaction costs (Redding & Sturm, 2008). 
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This is, in fact, closely related to the “home bias” concept that I studied in the second 
essay of this dissertation.  
(6) BuyerSellerBothUS: An indicator that both parties are from the United States. This is 
a special case for “BuyerSellerSameCountry”.  
(7) logSellerMonth: Logarithm of the number of months that the seller has signed up on 
this market. 
(8) logExpertiseLength: Each seller has a “resume” page where they can post their 
resumes or further describe their experiences and expertise (which are not verified by the 
site). This variable captures the length of the document.  
(9) logBidAmount: Logarithm of the dollar amount of the bid.  
(10) logBidOrder: Logarithm of the order in which the bid was placed. A larger number 
suggests that the bid was placed later. Since the bids are displayed in the order they are 
received by default, earlier bids are more likely to be noticed and accepted.  
(11) noCommentBid: An indicator variable that the bid does not come with a message.  
(12) ProjectAmtRange: controls for the size of projects, I first calculated the final project 
cost that the buyer actually paid for each project in the sample. For pay-for-time contracts, 
this is the hourly rating that the seller bid, multiplied by the estimated number of hours. 
This amount is then “binned” into different intervals: 1 if it's lower than $100, 2 if it's 
between $100 and $200, 3 if between $200 and $300, 4 if between $300 and $400, and 5 
for $400 and above.
13
 These are then included in the estimation as a series of dummies in 
a saturated model specification.  
 
                                                 
13
 The examples of projects on page 10 cover different ranges of the project costs.  
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5. Model 
The main goal of this study is to understand how buyers' choice criteria of 
potential sellers change under different contract mechanisms. One of the major 
hypotheses that I test is whether the new monitoring technologies in PFT contracts reduce 
the effectiveness of traditional signals such as online reputations and certifications, as 
compared to PFD contracts. The dataset used in this study has some very appealing 
features that suit this purpose very well. First, since I focused on buyers and sellers who 
do not have prior relationships, all information that led to a buyer's decision is captured in 
the data. Unobserved factors that may have contributed to these choices are minimized, 
and can be considered orthogonal to my variables of interest. This is consistent with the 
identification strategy in Angrist (1998). Second, whereas most prior studies only have 
information about sellers that were ultimately chosen, I have information about others 
who are rejected by the buyer. Such information sheds light on how buyers made their 
decisions. Third, this website uses a sealed auction format; only the buyers see who the 
bidders are, and how much the bid amount is. This ensures that the bids among sellers are 
largely independent of each other, allowing for proper statistical modeling. 
Given these features, I used maximum likelihood estimation of logistic models to 
estimate the probability that the buyer accepts a bid. Independent variables are virtually 
all the information that buyers had access to when they decide whom to contract. 
Although all bids placed in these auctions are independent of each other, I estimated the 
standard errors using clustered sandwich estimators to allow for intragroup correlation, 
where a cluster is specified to be an auction (a request for bid).  
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5.1 Main model of buyers’ choice: Full sample analysis 
My main working hypothesis is that the effect of reputation and certification 
(hypotheses 1 and 2) changes when contract forms change. Hence, I incorporated in the 
logistic regression a dummy variable indicating a Pay-for-Time contract, which was then 
interacted with other variables of interest. For the overall sample – which includes bids 
from bidders who have no ratings, no expert certifications, or bids that were placed 
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In other words, I multiplied the PFT dummy with dichotomous variables that 
indicated no rating bids, no comment bids, and no certification bids – respectively. 
Results of this model are shown in Table 3.1. We can see that PFT itself is statistically 
significant, suggesting that the intercept term for the PFT and PFD are different. Its 
interaction with the no-rating dummy is also significant; the other two interactions are 
however not. It appears that ratings play a different role under different contract forms, 
but the effect of certification is insignificant.  
To delve deeper into the differences across these contract forms, I then excluded 
interaction terms and estimate the model separately on the PFT contract subsample 
(Sample #1), and the PFD contract subsample (#2). Unreported results show highly 
consistent patterns with Table 3.1: dummy variables indicating whether or not there is no 
comment, and whether or not there is no certification, are statistically insignificant for 
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both subsamples. The dummy variable for no-Rating also shows a pattern consistent with 
my hypothesis: sellers (developers) with no ratings are significantly disadvantaged under 
Pay-for-Deliverables contracts, but only marginally significant for PFT contracts. 
Therefore, Hypothesis #1 is supported.  
Hypothesis 2 (certifications), on the other hand, is only partially supported. While 
certification is insignificant under pay-for-time contracts (consistent with Hypothesis 2), 
it is also insignificant under pay-for-deliverable contracts. A possible reason is that the 
threshold of such certifications in this market is relatively low: Exams are available 
online for free, and sellers can take exams multiple times until they pass. Hence, even 
under pay-for-deliverable contracts, the effect of such certification may not be significant.  
Some auxiliary results are also interesting. I found evidence that on average, 
buyers prefer sellers who are from their same country, a phenomenon consistent with the 
“home bias” literature and also the findings from the second essay of this dissertation. 
The tendency to offshore is actually less than what mass media would have us believe: 
The odds that a same-country vendor is chosen are actually over 250% of that of 
someone in a foreign country. This pattern persists in many more specifications that I 
shall discuss, and is robust to the inclusion of variables such as the time zone difference 
and whether English is the official language. In addition, when I replaced this variable 
with a dummy that took the value of 1 when both buyer and seller are from the United 
States, I obtain the same result. In other words, under comparable degrees of uncertainty 
(first time interactions), US buyers also prefer domestic sellers rather than foreign ones.  
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Some auction variables are also significant predictors of bidding outcomes, and 
their results are largely to be expected: bids placed earlier are more likely to be successful, 
and higher amount of bids are less likely to be chosen.  
I further investigated the interaction effect between some other variables. For 
instance, even though the model above suggests that having no ratings is a bad signal, it 
could be much worse if the seller has been on the market for a long time. The fact that a 
seller has been on the market for a long time but has obtained no contracts can indicate 
bad quality. Future buyers can simply “herd” and choose to ignore those sellers.  
To test this effect, I included another interaction term between the indicator 
variable for “no rating,” and “number of months since vendor signed up.” While “no 
rating” is shown to be negatively associated with the chances of winning, it is 
significantly worse for sellers who are on the market longer. In other words, between two 
sellers who are not rated, the ones who joined the site earlier are even less likely to win a 
contract. No-rating suggests that the seller has not been chosen by any other buyer so far. 
The longer they stay in that situation, the less attractive they become.  
5.2 Modeling buyers’ choices: Volume and valence of ratings 
The above analyses, however, only use dichotomous variables for rating and 
certification. This may be sufficient for certification (bids either have an “expert” icon 
next to it, or it does not), but it is certainly worth exploring the actual level of rating and 
the number of ratings.  
I first analyze the number of ratings as well as the average rating of sellers when 
they place bids. These variables are displayed prominently to buyers when bids are 
placed. I replaced the dummy variable of “no rating” with two new variables: (1) 
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logarithm of the number of ratings that the seller has at the time of the bid; and (2) the 
average of ratings that the seller has received at the time of the bid. To study whether the 
effect of the volume and valence of ratings change under different contract formats, I first 
conduct an interaction analysis by creating interaction terms between PFT (dummy) and 
the logarithm of number of ratings, as well as the interaction term between PFT (dummy) 
and the average rating. I then run the overall model with these interaction terms in the 
combined sample. I also excluded auctions that choose sellers who did not have ratings at 
the time of the request in this estimation. Results are shown in Table 3.2. It can be seen 
that the volume of rating at the time of bid has a significant interaction effect with the 
PFT dummy variable, suggesting that at least the effect of rating volumes could change 
when contract forms change. To further illustrate how the effect of ratings change under 
different contract formats, I then ran the same analysis on these two subsamples 
sequentially, and present these results in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 shows that variables 
examined previously display very consistent results: certification is insignificant, while 
bidding order and bid amount matters. On the other hand, ratings variables show some 
interesting patterns. For instance, while having a large number of ratings in pay-for-
deliverable (PFD) contracts significantly increases the chances of securing the contract, 
the effect is statistically insignificant in pay-for-time (PFT) contracts. Meanwhile, while 
the average rating has a positive and statistically effect on the chances of winning a 
contract under PFD arrangements, the effect is insignificant for PFT contracts as well. In 
fact, the magnitudes of these coefficients are also smaller in PFT contracts.  
In other words, the results above suggest that sellers who entered the market 
earlier, established good reputations and accumulated a long work history had a 
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significant advantage when they competed in the market, especially under pay-for-
deliverables (PFD) contracts. This in turn gave them more opportunities to increase the 
volume of their ratings. The cumulative advantage for established sellers in the online 
market can be very significant, consistent with the predictions of Matthew Effects 
(Merton, 1968). This effect exists both for the volume of ratings that the seller has, as 
well as the valence of ratings. The more jobs you did in the past, and the better you did 
on those jobs, the more likely you are going to get jobs in the future. While this is not 
entirely surprising, it does have a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of the market. 
New entrants will find it very difficult to compete with the incumbents. This can also be 
harmful for the development of the marketplace itself, as it competes with other online 
outsourcing platforms to attract new users.  
My results under pay-for-time (PFT) contracts, by contrast, show that it is 
possible to mitigate the market’s tendency to polarize by implementing new contract 
forms. By redistributing the burden of risk between buyers and sellers, pay-for-time 
contracts allows buyers to “experiment” with sellers who are less experienced on the 
market,
14
 giving them a chance at the competition. From another perspective, the new 
PFT contract, made possible by the advancement in monitoring technologies, allows 
buyers to substitute old information from others (ratings) with first-hand experiential 




                                                 
14
 It should be noted, however, that a lack of experience on this market does not mean the developer 
him/herself lacks experience. They may simply be new to this marketplace, and it is difficult for these 
online markets to verify the validity of their resumes.  
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6. An exploratory analyses: Textual contents of seller communications 
Textual content of sellers’ communications to potential buyers could play an 
important role in buyers’ choice of sellers. What they place in their first communication 
to the buyer can affect their chances of winning due to the limited amount of information 
that a buyer has of the seller. Much like entrepreneurs “pitching” their ideas at venture 
capitalists, these vendors only have a limited opportunity to convince a potential buyer. 
Moreover, since buyers have different priorities when deciding between PFT versus PFD 
contracts, it is very likely that some language features are important for pay-for-time 
contracts, while others are more important for pay-for-deliverable contracts.  So far, no 
empirical studies have examined the effect of textual comments, largely due to the 
sensitive nature of such data. To fill this gap, I conduct exploratory analyses of how the 
characteristics of textual communications affect sellers’ chance of winning a contract. I 
estimated the model on the subsample of auctions that do not choose a bid without 
comments.  
The first variable that I examined is the number of typos. It is possible that typos 
make it difficult to communicate; therefore, a higher number of typos can make a seller 
less attractive. Meanwhile it is also likely that buyers can be tolerant of these typos in 
search of a good deal. I use open-source software GNU Aspell to achieve this by 
submitting these text files (via Perl scripts) to an English dictionary
15
 associated with 
GNU Aspell, and compared each word against the dictionary. The number of typos was 
recorded for each comment associated with bids. 
                                                 
15
 Copyrighted by Kevin Atkinson, http://wordlist.sourceforge.net/  
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I studied two alternative metrics for typos: the total number of typos in the 
vendor's message, and the ratio of this number to the total number of words. While the 
odds ratios associated with these variables were indeed smaller than 1, they were not 
statistically significant in all specifications described earlier. It thus appears that buyers in 
this market seemed to be tolerant of typos; they either did not consider them a signal of 
communication difficulties, or fully anticipated them in this market. 
The second set of variables is generated from LIWC (Linguistic Inquirer and 
Word Count), a computerized linguistic analysis program that I also used in the first 
essay of the dissertation. The two main variables that I am interested in are “Time” and 
“Money” variables, as they represent two of the main dimensions that buyers consider 
when they choose a vendor. I find that “time” words are a statistically significant 
predictor of bid success only for pay-for-time (PFT) contracts, but insignificant in pay-
for-deliverable (PFD) contracts. For PFT contracts, a larger number of “time” words are 
associated with higher chances of winning. “Money” words, on the other hand, are also 
significant only for PFT contracts. The difference is that a larger number of “Money” 
words are associated with lower chances of winning. 
Results reported in Table 3.4 suggest that buyers are more concerned about 
contents in the sellers’ messages when screening transaction partners under PFT contracts 
rather than PFD contracts, consistent with the risk that they are bearing. Under pay-for-
time (PFT) contracts, buyers will pay for the number of hours that the developer will be 
working. Therefore, a more detailed discussion of time will alleviate buyers’ concerns on 
that dimension, and can increase a seller’s chances of winning the contract. On the other 
hand, when the contract is “pay-for-deliverables,” (PFD) buyers seem to be place less 
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attention to the content of the text messages. The price of the project is the main 
information that a buyer is concerned about – most categories of the text characteristics 
do not significantly predict winning a contract, either statistically or economically.   
A few other variables also show some noteworthy patterns. I found that the 
number of words with more than 6 letters is negatively associated with chances of 
winning, although the odds ratio is relatively small in scale. “We” words (including “we,” 
“our,” and so on), on the other hand, were not significant predictors in either PFT or PFD 
contracts. While this contrasts with the literature (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2006; Hardy, 
Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Kilker, 1999; Levina 2006), this result may simply reflect the 
nature of jobs being outsourced on this market, which are a lot smaller than the 
multimillion dollar projects reported in prior empirical studies. Many of these results are 
robust to specifications.  
7. Implications 
Sociologists have long identified the Matthew Effects (Merton, 1968) in 
economic life: in a competitive environment, individuals, organizations and entities that 
were previously in an advantageous position can continue to enjoy their advantage. This 
is similar to the idea of “preferential attachment” (Hills, Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & 
Smith, 2009), or the phenomenon of “the rich grows richer, while the poor grows poorer.” 
Sociologists also refer to this as Cumulative Advantage (DiPrete, Eirich, Cook, & 
Massey, 2006). For electronic commerce websites, such tendency may not be ideal as it is 
likely to drive away new vendors, yet it is indeed happening: Consumers are more likely 
to buy from sellers with more ratings and higher ratings.  This essay of my dissertation 
reveals an analogy in online outsourcing: Pay-for-deliverables (PFD) contracts, a 
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dominant form of contract on this marketplace, very much favors sellers (developers) 
with longer job history on the marketplace, and those with higher average ratings. The 
cumulative advantage inherent in these online rating systems has significant implications 
for market design, competition, and public policies as well, as it can easily lead to higher 
market concentrations over time, and limit the competitiveness of new entrants.  
One implication of this study is that changing contractual forms, made possible by 
the emergence of new monitoring technologies in online outsourcing markets, can 
partially mitigate Matthew Effects. By redistributing the burden of risk between buyers 
and sellers, buyers will have an incentive to take some risks and hire less-known, less-
experienced sellers under pay-for-time contracts. This is because they are allowed to stop 
the transactions if the sellers turn out to be of low-ability. In other words, buyers are 
substituting second-hand historical information, with their own first-hand experiential 
information. Broadly speaking, electronic commerce websites concerned about 
expanding their customer base can consider incentive mechanisms to redistribute the 
risks between buyers and sellers.  
The second implication from the findings discussed above is that certifications 
may not always be effective. It is possible that this is unique only to this website, and 
only to the particular types of certifications. However, given the popularity of third-party 
certifications in decentralized online markets such as eBay, the current study suggests 
that we should not take certifications' effectiveness for granted. Although such 
certifications do provide an extra “icon,” they do not necessarily increase vendors' 
chances of obtaining contracts.  
112 
Last but not least, my exploratory analyses show some interesting potentials for 
computerized text analysis. While the analyses I reported here is largely exploratory, the 
results do show that buyers take into account what was written by the vendors, especially 
under pay-for-time contracts where the relationship is more persistent – rather than a one-
shot exchange under PFD contracts. For platforms such as online outsourcing markets, 
implementing automatic text analyses programs can potentially help buyers increase the 
efficiency of screening vendors, especially as when I am able to link textual cues to 
project outcomes. This will be addressed in a separate paper.  
8. Limitations and Future Research 
The current study has a few limitations that readers should be aware of. Software 
projects in this context are much smaller compared to typical outsourcing contracts, and 
this could constrain the generalizability of my findings. Indeed, many outsourcing 
contracts that we read about in the mass media involved millions of dollars over multiple 
years. By contrast, the contracts in this marketplace represents the “long tail” of online 
outsourcing. Therefore, readers have to take these findings with a grain of salt when they 
apply them to larger contracts. Replicating my analyses on datasets of larger vendors and 
clients will be certainly highly desirable, especially if researchers can also obtain 
information about reputation, certifications, and communications between vendors and 
their clients, including vendors who are unsuccessful in their bids for contracts.  
My primary goal in this paper is not about the choice of contract formats. By 
constructing two non-overlapping subsamples of different contractual forms, I sought to 
understand how contract forms moderate the relationship between a vendor's reputation 
and their chance of winning a contract. A natural extension of this analysis is certainly to 
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go beyond dyads of first-time interactions and better understand the endogenous choice 
of contractual forms in this context, especially between buyers and sellers who have 
repeated interactions. As described in the paper, the proportion of buyer-seller pairs that 
switched from pay-for-deliverables to pay-for-time contracts is very small. It is possible, 
however, that as users become more familiar with this new arrangement, I will observe 
more “switching” of contract forms. At that time, I will be able to extend the analyses in 
this paper to model the contract choice endogenously.  
A second extension of the current study will be incorporating some metrics for the 
outcome of projects. This will be the focus of a separate paper.  
Another limitation of the current study is that, while I focus on buyer-seller pairs 
that have no prior contacts so as to reduce the confounding effects of endogeneity, the 
analyses are still inherently cross-sectional. My ongoing research using this dataset will 
leverage natural experiments and microeconometric techniques to better identify the 
effects of some variables, especially the causal effect of certifications.  
My analysis of the textual comments is one of the first efforts to study the effect 
of written language on buyer choice of vendors. Though there are much more advanced 
text mining techniques available, LIWC has been broadly used in psychology and 
management, and it yields similar results to other packages such as General Inquirer 
(Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008). Yet another valid critique of my 
analysis is comparable to the “Lucas Critiques” in economics: when vendors realize how 
buyers respond to their wordings in the communications, they may accordingly change 
how they write in the future, which can potentially change how buyers screen vendors. 
These are certainly interesting dynamic interactions that can be explored in future 
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research. However, it does not affect the validity of the current research; these 
communications are private between buyers and vendors. These communications are only 
obtained under a non-disclosure agreement, and neither this website nor its competitors 
has done analyses like this before. At least in the time frame that I studied, no such 
results were revealed to vendors.  
9. Conclusions 
The advancement of information technologies, especially Internet technologies, 
promises to change the landscape of labor markets forever (Autor, 2001). How buyers 
and sellers (workers) are matched, how services are delivered, and how efforts are 
monitored, will be dramatically different in the online market. The monitoring 
technologies used on the website that I described here is but one such development, yet 
has already brought about a new contract form (pay-for-time contracts) that dramatically 
changes how buyers use traditional signaling mechanisms. As my results show, with pay-
for-time (PFT) contracts, buyers can forego second-hand, past information about a 
potential trading partner (online ratings) and instead use first-hand information through 
their own interaction with a seller. Further developments of internet technologies will 
continue to change the way transactional ties are formed in decentralized online markets, 
creating a rich area for empirical research. █ 
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DISSERTATION SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The growth of online marketplaces populated with atomistic individuals and small firms 
facilitates transactions that were infeasible in traditional settings. While the sheer number 
of smaller participants exacerbates issues of information asymmetry, web 2.0 
technologies have also enabled the growth of innovative mechanisms, such as social 
networks, that can potentially help mitigate informational problems in these decentralized 
markets.  
Online peer-to-peer lending and software outsourcing are two examples of such 
markets and provide the contexts for my dissertation. Drawing on theories from 
information systems and other disciplines, I empirically study how participants in these 
markets establish transaction relationships to realize the gains from trade. Each of these 
essays emphasizes one particular factor that determines who is matched to whom in these 
online markets. In the first essay, strangers who are not part of the borrowers’ network 
can screen borrowers by the nature of ties that the borrowers possess, and the presence or 
absence of certain ties can serve as informational cues about the borrower’s credibility.  
In the second essay, I find evidence that even though the context is electronic commerce, 
geographic information still has an impact on individual decision making. Finally in the 
third essay, I find that contract mechanisms moderate the effect of various signals on 
buyers’ choice of vendors.  
In summary, the three essays of my dissertation provide a better understanding of 
how online social networks, geographic information, contracting forms and various other 
signals affect the formation of transactional ties in these highly decentralized, “virtual” 
marketplaces. Findings from these studies not only are beneficial to market participants, 
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but even regulators who will find it increasingly necessary to regulate these markets. 
Moreover, my studies also contribute to the growing IS literature of empirical studies in 
electronic commerce, especially those related to online social networks, outsourcing, 
contracting, and reputation systems.  
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APPENDICES FOR ESSAY 1 
Figure 3 
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analysis time
Cox proportional hazards regression
The three numbers in each box are the coefficient for funding probability, coefficient for interest rate on funded 
loans, and the hazards ratio in the Cox model, respectively. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 1.1: Borrowers’ FICO score and Prosper credit grades 
 
Prosper Credit Grade: AA A B C D E HR 
Borrower’s FICO Score: 
760 
and up 
720-759 680-719 640-679 600-639 560-599 520-559 
 
This table reports the correspondence between the letter ratings assigned by Prosper.com to a listing and the 
listing borrower’s Fair Isaac Credit Score.  
 
Table 1.2: Variables and their descriptions 
Table 1.2 reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the paper. My 
sample comprises 205,131 borrower listings on Prosper.com that have a listing date between 





Name Variable Description 
 
Hard Credit Information 
CreditGradeA
A 
1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade AA; 0 otherwise.  
This is the baseline grade, not 
included in estimation.   
CreditGradeH
R 
1 if borrower's credit grade at 
time of listing is in grade HR; 0 
otherwise 
CreditGradeA 1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade A; 0 otherwise 
DebtToIncom
eRatio 
Debt-to-income ratio of borrower 
at listing 
CreditGradeB 1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade B; 0 otherwise 
BankCardUtili
zation 
Bank Card Utilization of 
borrower at time of listing, or the 
percentage of credit line issued 
by the bank that has been utilized 
CreditGradeC 1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade C; 0 otherwise 
BankCard2 Quadratic term of 
BankCardUtilization 
CreditGradeD 1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade D; 0 otherwise 
InquiriesLast6
months 
Number of credit inquiries in the 
prior 6 months before listing 
CreditGradeE 1 if borrower's credit grade at time of 
listing is in grade E; 0 otherwise 
YearsSinceFir
stCredit 
Number of years between the the 
borrower's first credit line and the 





Dummy: 1 for a close auction ListingCat5 1 if the borrower chooses 




Borrower's asking interest rate on the 
listing 
ListingCat6 1 if the borrower chooses “Auto 
Loans” as the listing category 
BorrowerMax
Rate2 
Quadratic term of borrower’s max 
rate 
ListingCat7 1 if the borrower chooses “Other 
Loans” as the listing category 
AmountReque
sted 
Amount requested by borrower in 
listing 
Duration3 1 if the duration of the listing is 3 
days.  This is the baseline 
duration 
TotalText Total length of texts provided in 
borrower profile and listing 
descriptions 
Duration5 1 if the duration of the listing is 5 
days, 0 otherwise 
ListingCat0 1 if the listing category information is 
unavailable; this is the baseline 
category and is not included in the 
estimation. 
Duration7 1 if the duration of the listing is 7 





Name Variable Description 
ListingCat1 1 if the borrower chooses “Debt 
Consolidation” as the listing category 
Duration10 1 if the duration of the listing is 
10 days, 0 otherwise 
ListingCat2 1 if the borrower chooses “Home 
Improvement Loans” as the listing 
category 
BorrowerFee Borrower closing fee charged by 
Prosper.com at the time of listing 
ListingCat3 1 if the borrower chooses “Business 
Loans” as the listing category 
LenderFee Lender service fee charged by 
Prosper.com at the time of listing 
ListingCat4 1 if the borrower chooses “Personal 
Loans” as the listing category 
  
 
Social Network Information - Groups 
GroupSize Number of members of the group 
where the borrower is a member.  
_Medical 1 if the borrower belongs to a 
group specifically mentioning 
helping with medical needs (e.g. 




1 if the borrower's group leader is 




1 if the borrower belongs to a 
group targeting at particular 
demographic groups, such as 
Hispanics, Vietnamese, or single 
parents; 0 otherwise 
_Alumni 1 if the borrower belongs to an 
alumni group - groups targeting at 
alumni of universities or companies; 
0 otherwise 
_Hobbies 1 if the borrower belongs to a 
group targeting at people with 
specific hobbies or careers; 0 
otherwise 
_Geography 1 if the borrower belongs to a 
geographically-oriented group - 
groups targeting at members of 
certain geographical regions; 0 
otherwise 
_Religion 1 if the borrower belongs to a 
religious group. 0 otherwise 
_Military 1 if the borrower belongs to a group 
targeting at military members or their 
families; 0 otherwise 
_Business 1 if the borrower belongs to a 
group specifically with the goal 
of helping small businesses or 
business developments; 0 
otherwise 
 
Social Network Information - Friendship Network 
ttlFriends Total number of friends of the 
borrower. This is the simplest 
measure of degree centrality in the 
friendship network, regardless of 
their roles or actions 
ttlPotentBid Total number of borrower's 
potential lender friends who bid 
on the borrower's listing.  This 
equals the difference between 
ttlPotentLend and ttlPotentNoBid 
ttlRole Total number of friends of the 
borrower who are either borrowers or 
lenders (i.e. have their identities 
verified) 
ttlRealBid Total number of borrower's real 
lender friends who bid on the 
borrower's listing 
ttlNoRole Total number of friends of the 
borrower who are neither borrowers 
nor lenders. This equals the 
difference between ttlFriends and 
ttlRole 
ttlRealNoBid Total number of borrower's real 
lender friends who did not bid on 
the borrower's listing.  Equals the 
difference between ttlRealLend 
and ttlRealBid 
ttlPureBorrow Total number of borrower's friends 
who are borrowers but not lenders.   
ttlRealBidWin Total number of borrower's real 
lender friends who bid on the 





Name Variable Description 
ttlLend Total number of borrower's friends 
who are lenders.  This equals the 




Total number of borrower's real 
lender friends who bid on the 
borrower's listing but lost 
ttlRealLend Total number of borrower's lender 
friends who are “real lenders”, or 
those who have already made loans 
prior to the time that the borrower 
(ego) posts the listing 
ttlPotentBidW
in 
Total number of borrower's 
potential lender friends who bid 
on the borrower's listing and win 
ttlPotentLend Total number of borrower's lender 
friends who are “potential lenders”, 
or those who has not made any actual 
loans prior to the time that the 
borrower (ego) posts the listing. This 




Total number of borrower's 
potential lender friends who bid 
on the borrower's listing and lost 
ttlPotentNoBid Total number of borrower's potential 
lender friends who did not bid on the 
borrower's listing 
ttlPotentBid Total number of borrower's 
potential lender friends who bid 
on the borrower's listing.  This 
equals the difference between 
ttlPotentLend and ttlPotentNoBid 
 
Additional Control Variables 
UsuryState 1 if borrower resides in a state with 
usury laws; 0 otherwise 
LenderRole 1 if the borrower has a lender 
role; 0 otherwise 
BankRate The average interest rate on a 36-
month consumer loan from a bank in 
the same market as the borrower, in 
the same month as the time of listing, 
and in the same credit grade of the 
borrower.  
LeaderRole 1 if the borrower is also a group 
leader; 0 otherwise 
SpikeDays 1 if there is abnormal search activities 





Table 1.3: Estimated models 
 
Model Variable Set 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Funding 
Probability 
Spec. P1 Spec. P2 Spec. P3 Spec. P4 Spec. P5  
Interest Rate Spec. H1 Spec. H2 Spec. H3 Spec. H4 Spec. H5 Spec. H6 
Loan Default Spec. C1 Spec. C2 Spec. C3 Spec. C4 Spec. C5 Spec. C6 
* The sets of variables used in each model are described in Table 1.4.  
 
 



















2 1 ttlNoRole, ttlRole 
3 2 ttlNoRole, ttlPureBorrow, ttlLend 
4 3 ttlNoRole, ttlPureBorrow, 
ttlPotentLend, ttlRealLend 
5 4 ttlNoRole, ttlPureBorrow, 
ttlPotentLend, ttlRealNoBid, 
ttlRealBid 





Table 1.5: Probability of Funding 
The table reports estimates of a probit specification in which the dependent variable is 
one if a listing on prosper.com is funded and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables include a 
borrower’s hard credit variables, social network variables, group affiliation, and other 
characteristics of the loan, the loan domicile, and the borrower plus quarterly time period fixed 
effects. Table 2 gives the detailed definitions of the variables. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
                                  Spec. P1 Spec. P2 Spec. P3 Spec. P4 Spec. P5 
ttlFriends                        0.033***     
                                  (0.008)     
ttlNoRole                          -0.020* -0.020** -0.017* -0.017 
                                   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
ttlRole                            0.106***    
                                   (0.017)    
ttlPureBorrow                      -0.006 -0.002 0.018 
                                    (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
ttlLend                             0.170***   
                                    (0.023)   
ttlPotentLend                        0.025  
                                     (0.022)  
ttlRealLend                          0.312***  
                                     (0.055)  
ttlPotentNobid                       -0.062** 
                                      (0.028) 
ttlPotentBid                          0.325*** 
                                      (0.050) 
ttlRealBid                            0.849*** 
                                      (0.044) 
ttlrealnobid                          -0.148*** 
                                      (0.022) 
ttlRealBidWin                          
                                       
ttlRealBidLose                         
                                       
bankrate                          -0.698 -0.752 -0.662 -0.662 -0.558 
                                  (1.693) (1.682) (1.685) (1.682) (1.697) 
borrowerFee                -5.722*** -5.629*** -5.732*** -5.648*** -5.672*** 
                                  (1.775) (1.737) (1.763) (1.743) (1.682) 
lenderFee -29.932*** -29.540*** -29.387*** -29.036*** -30.203*** 
                                  (4.583) (4.508) (4.512) (4.514) (4.592) 
usurystate                        -0.077** -0.075** -0.074** -0.071** -0.072** 
                                  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
loggroupsize                      -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.003 
                                  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
leaderdummy                       0.054** 0.047** 0.048** 0.043** 0.073*** 
                                  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
creditgrdA                        -0.375*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.373*** -0.381*** 
                                  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
creditgrdB                        -0.806*** -0.805*** -0.805*** -0.805*** -0.814*** 
                                  (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) 
creditgrdC                        -1.457*** -1.455*** -1.456*** -1.457*** -1.470*** 
                                  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
creditgrdD                        -2.105*** -2.102*** -2.107*** -2.109*** -2.133*** 
                                  (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) 
creditgrdE                        -2.831*** -2.825*** -2.833*** -2.837*** -2.867*** 
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                                  (0.139) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139) 
creditgrdHR                        -3.310*** -3.304*** -3.312*** -3.318*** -3.354*** 
                                  (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
bankcardutilization               0.359*** 0.356*** 0.357*** 0.355*** 0.357*** 
                                  (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) 
bankcard2                         -0.203** -0.201** -0.200** -0.200** -0.199** 
                                  (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095) 
inquirieslast6months              -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
debttoincomeratio                 -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.106*** 
                                  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
listingcat4                      -0.164*** -0.162*** -0.164*** -0.158*** -0.162*** 
                                  (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
listingcat2                      0.145*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
                                  (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
listingcat1                      0.176*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 
                                  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
logamount                         -0.706*** -0.707*** -0.708*** -0.709*** -0.714*** 
                                  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
borrowermaximumrate               24.308*** 24.307*** 24.406*** 24.558*** 24.844*** 
                                  (1.099) (1.095) (1.093) (1.094) (1.092) 
borrowermaxrate2                  -37.911*** -37.904*** -38.057*** -38.357*** -38.849*** 
                                  (2.234) (2.220) (2.212) (2.217) (2.220) 
auctionformat                     0.122*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 
                                  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
grpleaderrewarded                 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 
                                  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
_Religion                        0.280*** 0.287*** 0.283*** 0.273*** 0.246*** 
                                  (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.085) (0.084) 
_Geography                       0.572** 0.536** 0.512** 0.467*** 0.411** 
                                  (0.241) (0.220) (0.200) (0.176) (0.161) 
_Alumni  0.529*** 0.526*** 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.527*** 
                                  (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) (0.100) 
logttltext                        0.225*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.222*** 
                                  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
borrowerintermediary              0.164*** 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 
                                  (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
_cons                             2.494*** 2.473*** 2.474*** 2.458*** 2.528*** 
                                  (0.192) (0.190) (0.192) (0.193) (0.190) 
N                                 205131 205131 205131 205131 205131 




Table 1.6: Interest Rate on Funded Listings 
The table reports two-stage estimates of a model in which the dependent variable is the 
interest rate on Prosper.com listings that are successfully funded. The probit selection equation 
models the probability of a listing being successfully funded. The explanatory variables include a 
borrower’s hard credit variables, social network variables, group affiliation, and other 
characteristics of the loan, the loan domicile, and the borrower plus quarterly time period fixed 
effects.  I report all estimated coefficients for the interest rate equation but suppress coefficients 
for all probit variables that are included in Table 5. The coefficients for all suppressed variables 
in the selection equation are consistent with the probit model in Table 5. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
                                  Spec. H1 Spec. H2 Spec. H3 Spec. H4 Spec. H5 Spec. H6 
ttlFriends                        -0.002***      
                                  (0.001)      
ttlNoRole                          0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
                                   (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ttlRole                            -0.005***     
                                   (0.001)     
ttlPureBorrow                      0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
                                    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ttlLend                             -0.006***    
                                    (0.001)    
ttlPotentLend                        -0.001   
                                     (0.001)   
ttlRealLend                          -0.007***   
                                     (0.001)   
ttlPotentNobid                       0.002** 0.002** 
                                      (0.001) (0.001) 
ttlPotentBid                          -0.008*** -0.008*** 
                                      (0.001) (0.001) 
ttlRealBid                            -0.007***  
                                      (0.001)  
ttlrealnobid                          0.002 0.001 
                                      (0.001) (0.001) 
ttlRealBidWin                          -0.006*** 
                                       (0.001) 
ttlRealBidLose                        -0.006*** 
                                       (0.002) 
bankrate                          0.104* 0.106** 0.102** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 
                                  (0.053) (0.048) (0.042) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) 
lenderservicing100                0.024*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
                                  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
borrowerclosing100                0.003** 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 -0.001* -0.001** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
usurystate                        0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
loggroupsize                      0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
                                  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
leaderdummy                       -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
                                  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
creditgrdA                        0.026*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
                                  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
creditgrdB                        0.058*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
                                  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
creditgrdC                        0.103*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 0.066*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 
126 
                                  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
creditgrdD                        0.150*** 0.138*** 0.124*** 0.097*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
                                  (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
creditgrdE                        0.209*** 0.192*** 0.173*** 0.137*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 
                                  (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
creditgrdHR                        0.244*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.158*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 
                                  (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
bankcardutilization               -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
                                  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
bankcard2                         0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
                                  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
inquirieslast6months              0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
                                  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
debttoincomeratio                 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
listingcat4                      0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 
                                  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
listingcat2                      -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.002** -0.001* 
                                  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
listingcat1                      -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
                                  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
logamount                         0.047*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
                                  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
borrowermaximumrate               -1.008*** -0.854*** -0.688*** -0.368*** 0.206*** 0.255*** 
                                  (0.135) (0.119) (0.102) (0.071) (0.038) (0.036) 
borrowermaxrate2                  2.749*** 2.507*** 2.246*** 1.746*** 0.846*** 0.769*** 
                                  (0.221) (0.195) (0.167) (0.117) (0.068) (0.064) 
auctionformat                     0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
grpleaderrewarded                 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 
                                  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
_Religion                        -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
                                  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
_Geography                       -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.001 
                                  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
_Alumni  -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
                                  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
logttltext                        -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
borrowerintermediary              -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
                                  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inverse Mills Ratio                            -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.047*** -0.016*** -0.013*** 
                                  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
_cons                             -0.083*** -0.073*** -0.065*** -0.050*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 
                                  (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Selection Equation: All variables used but not reported for conciseness 
spikedays                         -0.050** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.051** 
                                  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 




Table 1.7: Time to Default of Funded Loans  
The table reports hazards ratio estimates of a Cox proportional hazards model of the time 
to default for borrower listings that are successfully funded on prosper.com. The explanatory 
variables include a borrower’s hard credit variables, social network variables, group affiliation, 
and other characteristics of the loan, the loan domicile, and the borrower plus quarterly time 
period fixed effects. Table 2 gives the detailed definitions of the variables. The table reports the 
exponentiated coefficients (hazards ratio), where values greater than 1 suggest that a higher value 
of the explanatory variable increases the risk of default. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
                                  Spec. C1 Spec. C2 Spec. C3 Spec. C4 Spec. C5 Spec. C6 
ttlFriends                        1.017      
                                  (0.021)      
ttlNoRole                          1.048 1.048 1.047 1.047 1.047 
                                   (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
ttlRole                            0.968     
                                   (0.027)     
ttlPureBorrow                      1.061 1.061 1.058 1.055 
                                    (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) 
ttlLend                             0.912**    
                                    (0.034)    
ttlPotentLend                        0.950   
                                     (0.061)   
ttlRealLend                          0.877***   
                                     (0.044)   
ttlPotentNobid                       0.964 0.964 
                                      (0.073) (0.071) 
ttlPotentBid                          0.910 0.916 
                                      (0.150) (0.150) 
ttlRealBid                            0.856**  
                                      (0.052)  
ttlrealnobid                          0.938 0.938 
                                      (0.113) (0.113) 
ttlRealBidWin                          0.791*** 
                                       (0.062) 
ttlRealBidLose                        1.086 
                                       (0.146) 
bankrate100                       0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.958 0.957 
                                  (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
usurystate                        1.102 1.100 1.098 1.098 1.098 1.100 
                                  (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
loggroupsize                      1.005 1.005 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004 
                                  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
leaderdummy                       1.043 1.050 1.051 1.051 1.049 1.048 
                                  (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
bankcard100                       0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
bankcard2_100                     1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
                                  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
inquirieslast6months              1.037*** 1.037*** 1.037*** 1.037*** 1.037*** 1.037*** 
                                  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
dti10                            1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 
                                  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
listingcat4                      1.238* 1.237* 1.244* 1.241* 1.240* 1.241* 
                                  (0.145) (0.145) (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
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listingcat2                      0.991 0.989 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.994 
                                  (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
listingcat1                      1.102 1.101 1.102 1.103 1.102 1.102 
                                  (0.130) (0.131) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) 
logamount                         1.329*** 1.332*** 1.336*** 1.337*** 1.338*** 1.339*** 
                                  (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
borrowerrate100                   1.088*** 1.088*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 
                                  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
auctionformat                     1.073 1.070 1.069 1.069 1.069 1.072 
                                  (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) 
grpleaderrewarded                 1.152*** 1.151*** 1.152*** 1.153*** 1.153*** 1.148*** 
                                  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
_Religion                        0.758 0.760 0.766 0.768 0.769 0.767 
                                  (0.180) (0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.185) 
_Geography                       0.404** 0.416** 0.426** 0.430** 0.430** 0.433** 
                                  (0.166) (0.166) (0.170) (0.171) (0.170) (0.170) 
_Alumni  0.406*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.409*** 0.408*** 0.409*** 
                                  (0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.123) (0.122) (0.123) 
logttltext                        0.990 0.989 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.991 
                                  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
borrowerintermediary              0.768*** 0.778*** 0.785*** 0.784*** 0.783*** 0.780*** 
                                  (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) 
creditgrdA                        1.696*** 1.692*** 1.692*** 1.692*** 1.694*** 1.691*** 
                                  (0.204) (0.204) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205) 
creditgrdB                        2.009*** 2.009*** 2.007*** 2.005*** 2.009*** 2.008*** 
                                  (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.235) (0.235) 
creditgrdC                        2.329*** 2.330*** 2.333*** 2.334*** 2.341*** 2.342*** 
                                  (0.333) (0.336) (0.337) (0.337) (0.338) (0.338) 
creditgrdD                        2.461*** 2.463*** 2.476*** 2.479*** 2.489*** 2.496*** 
                                  (0.466) (0.465) (0.468) (0.467) (0.470) (0.472) 
creditgrdE                        3.055*** 3.064*** 3.097*** 3.106*** 3.122*** 3.139*** 
                                  (0.896) (0.895) (0.902) (0.903) (0.908) (0.911) 
creditgrdHR                        4.550*** 4.567*** 4.638*** 4.655*** 4.685*** 4.710*** 




APPENDICES FOR ESSAY 2 
Table 2.1: Evidence of Home Bias – lending amount (overall market) 
 This table presents “macro” evidence of investors’ home bias in all lending activities on 
Prosper.com up until April, 2009. Home bias exists for virtually all states: the percentage of 
lending amount from home-state lenders (Column 3) exceeds the share of home-state lenders’ 





Total investment of lenders in this state / 
total investment from all states 
Funding amount from home-state lenders  / 
total amount to borrowers in this state 
AK 0.37% 1.20% 
AL 0.47% 0.60% 
AR 0.40% 2.40% 
AZ 1.75% 2.20% 
CA 22.39% 24.11% 
CO 2.01% 2.54% 
CT 1.10% 2.03% 
DC 0.48% 0.52% 
DE 0.26% 3.36% 
FL 5.53% 6.37% 
GA 2.45% 3.17% 
HI 0.61% 8.32% 
IA 0.50% 2.11% 
ID 0.39% 1.17% 
IL 5.75% 6.81% 
IN 0.78% 1.28% 
KS 0.53% 3.66% 
KY 0.45% 2.53% 
LA 0.68% 2.18% 
MA 2.69% 3.90% 
MD 2.98% 4.08% 
ME 0.15% 0.44% 
MI 1.94% 2.59% 
MN 1.37% 2.28% 
MO 0.84% 1.55% 
MS 0.19% 0.71% 
MT 0.24% 0.99% 
NC 2.17% 2.90% 
ND 0.09% 0.20% 
NE 0.39% 1.93% 
                                                 
16
 The only state not reported here is SD, where there is no loans made to that state recorded in the Prosper database as 
of April 2009. Lenders from SD account for 0.14% of all loaned amount on Prosper.com.  
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NH 0.66% 1.13% 
NJ 3.24% 4.40% 
NM 0.67% 1.09% 
NV 1.11% 2.10% 
NY 7.08% 8.96% 
OH 1.80% 2.47% 
OK 0.53% 1.18% 
OR 1.55% 2.56% 
PA 2.81% 4.88% 
RI 0.17% 0.17% 
SC 0.60% 1.02% 
TN 0.78% 1.57% 
TX 8.24% 10.82% 
UT 1.11% 2.52% 
VA 5.00% 6.51% 
VT 0.13% 3.95% 
WA 3.55% 4.66% 
WI 1.02% 1.72% 
WV 0.17% 0.38% 
WY 0.07% 0.78% 
 
Table 2.2: Evidence of Home Bias – number of bids (overall market) 
Same comparison as Table 1a, except using the number of bids instead of the amount – for the 
top borrowing states 
 
State 
share of bid count of the state's lenders 
in the entire dataset 
share of bid count from same-state 
lenders 
CA 20.40% 21.10% 
GA 2.66% 2.90% 
FL 5.61% 5.90% 
IL 5.07% 5.40% 
TX 7.56% 8.30% 
NY 7.18% 7.90% 
WA 3.85% 4.30% 
MI 2.05% 2.40% 
MD 3.08% 3.30% 
OH 1.98% 2.20% 
AZ 1.95% 2.20% 
NC 2.40% 2.60% 
MO 0.97% 1.40% 
OR 1.60% 1.90% 
MN 1.60% 1.90% 
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Table 2.3: Main results 
  
For easier interpretations, I report odds ratio in the table instead of coefficients. An odds 
ratio greater than 1 means the variable has a positive effect on the probability of occurrence.  
Dependent variable: 1 if a bid is placed, 0 otherwise.  
 














Dummy for Same-State borrowers 1.130* 1.698*** 0.492***  
                                  (0.058) (0.097) (0.068)  
Geographic distance (borrower state to CA)    0.988 
                                     (0.007) 
Economic distance (Borrower state to CA)    0.582*** 
                                     (0.078) 
Loan amount requested by borrower 0.592*** 0.793*** 0.333*** 0.586*** 
                                  (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) 
Borrower number of requests 1.170*** 1.048 1.343*** 1.169*** 
                                  (0.021) (0.027) (0.034) (0.021) 
Borrower asking interest rate 0.087*** 0.040*** 0.007*** 0.100*** 
                                  (0.019) (0.012) (0.002) (0.021) 
Borrower auction format 0.232*** 0.033*** 0.394*** 0.232*** 
                                  (0.044) (0.020) (0.077) (0.044) 
Borrower associated with group 0.673*** 0.645*** 0.670*** 0.663*** 
                                  (0.052) (0.069) (0.070) (0.051) 
Bidder experience (log of # months on 
Prosper) 1.624*** 2.055*** 1.151 1.624*** 
                                  (0.077) (0.128) (0.083) (0.077) 
Bidder is a trader (re-sells loans) 1.192*** 1.274*** 1.071 1.192*** 
                                  (0.057) (0.076) (0.083) (0.057) 
Bidder is a group leader 1.178* 0.869 1.732*** 1.178* 
                                  (0.079) (0.081) (0.169) (0.079) 
Bidder is a borrower 0.650*** 0.569*** 0.788** 0.650*** 
                                  (0.032) (0.037) (0.060) (0.032) 
Bidder # of friends 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.003 
                                  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Dummy for grade A borrowers 2.922***   2.894*** 
                                  (0.250)   (0.249) 
Dummy for AA borrowers 4.215***   4.185*** 
                                  (0.373)   (0.373) 
Dummy for B borrowers 1.469***   1.463*** 
                                  (0.129)   (0.129) 
Dummy for C borrowers 1.108   1.083 
                                  (0.099)   (0.098) 
Loan purpose dummy: debt consolidation 0.885** 0.676*** 1.374*** 0.891** 
                                  (0.040) (0.040) (0.107) (0.040) 
Loan purpose dummy: home improvement 0.741*** 0.700*** 0.674** 0.748*** 
                                  (0.049) (0.054) (0.092) (0.049) 
Loan purpose dummy: Business loan 0.428*** 0.310*** 0.816 0.434*** 
                                  (0.033) (0.030) (0.107) (0.033) 
Loan purpose dummy: Student loan 0.513*** 0.078*** 0.956 0.509*** 
                                  (0.053) (0.026) (0.126) (0.053) 
N                                 358832 110208 248624 358832 
Chi-squared                       5165.160 1520.606 1385.802 5586.844 
 
 
Odds ratios reported; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. (* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001) 
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APPENDICES FOR ESSAY 3 
Table 3.1: Full model with interactions 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with 
a logistic regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow 
for intra-auction correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to 
interpret for binary variables; standard errors in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 1 suggests 
that a higher value of the explanatory variable is positively associated with the probability of 
winning. Some variables, including dummies for project amount range suppressed for brevity. * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 
ExpertCertified                   1.195 
                                  (0.768) 
noRating                          0.339*** 
                                  (0.093) 
noCommentBid                      0.899 
                                  (0.250) 
BuyerSellerSameCountry             2.036*** 
                                  (0.391) 
logBidAmount                      0.636*** 
                                  (0.038) 
logBidOrder                       0.628*** 
                                  (0.029) 
logSellerMonths                    1.592*** 
                                  (0.132) 
logExpertiseLength                1.038 
                                  (0.043) 
PFT                               2.846*** 
                                  (0.363) 
PFT*Expert                        1.025 
                                  (0.683) 
PFT*Rating                        2.380*** 
                                  (0.793) 
Intercept                             0.116*** 
                                  (0.049) 




Table 3.2: Full model with interaction terms: Number and Average of Ratings 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with 
a logistic regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow 
for intra-auction correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to 
interpret for binary variables; robust standard errors are in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 
1 suggests that a higher value of the explanatory variable is positively associated with the 
probability of winning. Some variables, including dummies for project amount range suppressed 
for brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
     Variables                             Odds Ratio  
ExpertCertified                   1.054 
                                  (0.691) 
logRatingsCount                   1.290*** 
                                  (0.091) 
AvgRating                         1.242* 
                                  (0.151) 
BuyerSellerSameCountry             2.036*** 
                                  (0.459) 
logBidAmount                      0.632*** 
                                  (0.043) 
logBidOrder                       0.650*** 
                                  (0.035) 
logCoderMonths                    1.422*** 
                                  (0.157) 
PFT                               10.422 
                                  (15.429) 
Certification X PFT                           1.059 
                                  (0.731) 
noComment X PFT                     1.720 
                                  (0.780) 
logAvgRating X PFT                  0.941 
                                  (0.146) 
logRateCount X PFT                  0.832* 




Table 3.3: Effect of Ratings on PFD and PFT samples 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with 
a logistic regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow 
for intra-auction correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to 
interpret for binary variables; standard errors in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 1 suggests 
that a higher value of the explanatory variable is positively associated with the probability of 
winning. Some control variables, including dummies for project amount range suppressed for 
brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
Variable                                  Odds Ratio under Pay-
for-Delivery Contracts 
Odds Ratio under 
Pay-for-Time 
Contracts 
ExpertCertified                   1.017 1.170 
                                  (0.651) (0.256) 
logRatingsCount                   1.229*** 1.094 
                                  (0.095) (0.097) 
AvgRating                         1.255* 1.166 
                                  (0.154) (0.117) 
BuyerSellerSameCountry             1.395 3.378*** 
                                  (0.470) (1.103) 
logBidAmount                      0.665*** 0.553*** 
                                  (0.061) (0.058) 
logBidOrder                       0.725*** 0.553*** 
                                  (0.050) (0.052) 
logSellerMonths                    1.616** 1.354** 
                                  (0.341) (0.184) 
logExpertiseLength                1.093 0.975 
                                  (0.068) (0.074) 
Intercept                             0.004*** 0.400 
                                  (0.005) (0.449) 




Table 3.4: Effect of Communication under Pay-for-Deliverable vs. Pay-for-Time 
Contracts 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with 
a logistic regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow 
for intra-auction correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to 
interpret for binary variables; robust standard errors are in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 
1 suggests that a higher value of the explanatory variable is positively associated with the 
probability of winning. Some variables, including dummies for project amount range suppressed 
for brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
     Variables                             Odds Ratio Under Pay-for-
Deliverable Contracts 
Odds Ratio Under Pay-
for-Time Contracts 
ExpertCertified                   0.988 1.300 
                                  (0.658) (0.260) 
noRating                          0.450*** 0.708 
                                  (0.126) (0.161) 
BuyerSellerSameCountry             1.861** 2.538*** 
                                  (0.506) (0.811) 
logBidAmount                      0.632*** 0.591*** 
                                  (0.063) (0.062) 
logBidOrder                       0.707*** 0.545*** 
                                  (0.047) (0.042) 
logSellerMonths                    2.152*** 1.340*** 
                                  (0.350) (0.138) 
logExpertiseLength                1.099* 1.033 
                                  (0.060) (0.072) 
Sixltr                            0.969*** 0.987 
                                  (0.011) (0.012) 
we                                0.972 0.994 
                                  (0.027) (0.039) 
auxverb                           0.959*** 0.971 
                                  (0.014) (0.021) 
time                              0.981 1.049** 
                                  (0.017) (0.020) 
money                             1.005 0.897** 
                                  (0.030) (0.049) 
noTypo                            0.745 0.843 
                                  (0.190) (0.230) 
Intercept 0.080*** 1.348 
                                  (0.062) (0.965) 
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